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ABSTRACT
An Analysis of Successful and Unsuccessful Terrorist Assassinations: Informing
Counterterrorism Through Situational Crime Prevention
by
Marissa Mandala

Advisor: Professor Joshua D. Freilich

This study applies environmental criminology and situational crime prevention (SCP) to
study successful and unsuccessful assassinations by terrorists. Using these perspectives, a series
of hypotheses were devised to understand the situational factors that contribute to successful
compared to unsuccessful assassinations. A random sample of roughly 1,000 successful and
1,000 unsuccessful assassination attacks taking place between 2005 and 2014 was acquired from
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Open source materials were then consulted to supplement
the GTD with the creation of new SCP variables. The hypotheses were tested in a binary logistic
regression, and additional regression models were created for 4 specific regions (the Middle East
& North Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Sub Saharan Africa). Results indicate support
for the application of SCP and environmental criminology to the study of assassinations by
terrorists. Specifically, successful assassinations are associated with guardianship, weapon type,
target location, terrorist location, attack intensity, and distance. Findings are largely consistent
across the different regions, however, the results from each regional model deviated slightly
from the full model, indicating that the impact of certain SCP variables on successful
assassinations vary by region.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation analyzes successful and unsuccessful terrorist assassination incidents
through the framework of environmental criminology and situational crime prevention (SCP). It
devises a series of hypotheses developed from the prior literature to identify characteristics
associated with successful (i.e., the target was killed) assassination outcomes. The main analysis
uses a random sample of 1,000 successful and 1,000 unsuccessful assassination incidents
between 2005 and 2014 from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The hypotheses are tested
in a series of binary logistic regression models.
Since the GTD provides limited details on assassination events, this dissertation
innovatively expands the dataset by utilizing open source material to add new SCP variables that
do not currently exist in any terrorism database. This approach allows for an improved and more
refined test of the SCP framework compared to if only the GTD variables were relied upon.
Importantly, this dissertation tests an additional 12 hypotheses, as opposed to only five
hypotheses available from the GTD variables. Studies have successfully employed a similar
strategy to examine maritime piracy by reviewing narratives published by the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) to code for SCP variables (Shane & Magnuson, 2014; Shane, Piza, &
Mandala, 2015). Mandala and Freilich (2017a) utilize this approach in their analysis of 100
successful and 100 unsuccessful assassinations. This dissertation therefore extends the previous
work conducted by Mandala and Freilich (2017a)1.

1

This dissertation extends Mandala and Freilich’s study (2017a) in five important ways. First, this dissertation uses
an enhanced sample of roughly 2000 incidents, as opposed to 200, to better detect significant effects. Second, it
includes 5 added hypotheses: H4: Attacks where suicide bombs are used, as opposed to other types of explosives,
are more likely to result in a successful assassination; H10: Attacks that occur at the target's home are less likely to
be successful than those that occur outside of physical buildings or structures; H13: Incidents where terrorists attack
from inside a motor vehicle, or while riding a motorcycle, are more likely to result in a successful assassination
compared to incidents where terrorists attack from outside (this hypothesis represents one of the only tests of Clarke
and Newman’s (2006) tools opportunity pillar); H14: Incidents where terrorists attack from inside a building or
structure are less likely to result in a successful assassination compared to incidents where terrorists attack from
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The field of criminology has been slow to study terrorism and political violence (Freilich
& LaFree, 2015). Some maintain that this is partly due to the difficulty in both defining and
measuring terrorism (Freilich, Chermak, & Simone, 2009; LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015).
However, in recent years, the field has increasingly embraced the study of terrorism generally as
well as specific terrorist tactics. Environmental criminology and SCP are also increasingly being
applied to terrorism (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Freilich & Newman, 2009). In contrast to
traditional criminology theories that stress distant causes of crime and why offenders commit
crime, environmental criminology and SCP focus on the near causes and opportunities that
facilitate a crime’s occurrence. In other words, the emphasis is on how the crime event is
committed. Environmental criminology involves analyzing a crime’s environment to discover
characteristics facilitating the crime’s occurrence (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008). SCP is derived
from environmental criminology and emphasizes the importance of analyzing specific forms of
crime to develop prevention measures to disrupt crime opportunities.
While researchers have examined specific terrorist tactics through a criminological lens,
such as suicide bombings, aerial hijackings, and kidnappings, the assassination tactic remains
relatively understudied. Although recent studies by Mandala and Freilich (2017a; 2017b) have
used criminology to study assassinations by terrorists, most of the assassination research exists in
fields outside of criminology, such as political science, history and psychology (Ben-Yehuda,
1990). Research notes the political, psychological and cultural impact successful assassinations

outside a building or structure; and H16: Attacks that produce more collateral deaths (deaths other than the intended
target/s and the terrorists) are more likely to result in a successful assassination compared to attacks that produce
fewer collateral deaths. Third, this dissertation tests 2 fewer independent variables since it utilizes more categorical
variables and therefore some variables are collapsed (i.e., security presence, others around, weapon type, target
location, and terrorist location). Fourth, it includes the same control variables, except instead of “terrorists
captured”, it incorporates “multiple terrorists present” since the open sources often do not provide information on
whether or not any terrorists were captured. Finally, this dissertation also conducts an in-depth supplemental
regional analysis for 4 regions (Middle East & North Africa; South Asia; Southeast Asia; Sub Saharan Africa),
whereas Mandala and Freilich (2017a) do not conduct any regional analysis.

2

can have on individual countries as well as the world (Unsgaard & Meloy, 2011; Appleton,
2000; Childers, 2013; Freedman, 1984). For example, Freedman (1984) shows that many
Americans were more shocked and depressed after President Kennedy’s assassination than they
were by their own father’s death. A large portion of the literature on assassinations in the United
States focuses on identifying the emotional and psychological factors motivating individual
assassins, including those who targeted several U.S. presidents, including Kennedy, Lincoln and
Reagan. Similarly, the United States Secret Service’s 1980-81 study analyzed the common
psychological and behavioral characteristics of potentially dangerous individuals within the
population (Heyman, 1984). The literature is mostly unempirical, rarely uses quantitative
methods, and seldom investigates the incident-level. Instead, the assassination literature tends to
examine case studies.
Since a successful assassination can inflict substantial damage, a reliance on
environmental criminology and SCP to help uncover opportunities for disrupting and preventing
such attacks seems warranted. This dissertation begins by reviewing the definitions of
assassination and terrorism in Chapter 1. It discusses the history of assassination, and highlights
how this tactic is connected with terrorism. The chapter also reviews the assassination literature.
Chapter 2 discusses environmental criminology and SCP and reviews the theoretical and
empirical literature on its application to terrorism. Chapter 3 reviews the hypotheses. Chapter 4
discusses the dissertation’s data and its dependent, independent and control variables. Chapter 5
explains the study’s methodology, and Chapter 6 reviews the results of the analyses conducted.
Chapter 7 discusses the implications of these results and Chapter 8 notes the study’s
contributions, limitations, and the avenues for future research to explore. The conclusion
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summarizes the main findings and their potential impact on counterterrorism practice, policy,
and research.

CH. 1: ASSASSINATION BACKGROUND

Defining Assassination and Terrorism
As noted, researchers encounter challenges in studying terrorism and political violence,
particularly with defining these complex issues. In fact, there is currently no universally accepted
definition of terrorism (Freilich et al., 2009; LaFree et al., 2015; Schmid & Jongman, 2005).
Schmid and Jongman’s (1988) study of over 100 academic definitions of terrorism, as well as
Weinberg, Penahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler’s (2004) examination of over 70 definitions,
demonstrates the lack of consensus. Different branches of the U.S. government, like the FBI and
U.S. State Department, even use different definitions of terrorism (LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw,
2009). Despite these varying definitions, many contain similar core elements (Schmid &
Jongman, 1988; Weingberg et al., 2004; LaFree & Ackerman, 2009). Most terrorism definitions
require that the act involve non-state actors, violence or force, political motivations, the creation
of fear, and making a threat (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Weingberg et al., 2004; LaFree &
Ackerman, 2009). Interestingly, most academic definitions on terrorism exclude any
psychological element (Weinberg et al., 2004).
There are also several different definitions of assassination, but here too there are some
commonalities. In one example, an assassination is defined in general terms as “the murder of (a
usually prominent person) by a sudden/secret attack, often for political reasons” (Stolnici &
Buda, 2012, p. 907). A more detailed definition is provided by The National Counterterrorism
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Center, which defines the tactic as the “targeted killing of a country’s public officials or
individuals who represent the political, economic, military, security, social, religious, media or
cultural establishments. The killings can be motivated by ideology, religion, politics, or
nationalism.”
This dissertation adopts the definition provided by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
since it uses GTD data on terrorist assassinations. The GTD defines an assassination as “an act
whose primary objective is to kill one or more specific, prominent individuals. Usually carried
out on persons of some note, such as high-ranking military officers, government officials,
celebrities, etc. Not to include attacks on non-specific members of a targeted group” (National
Consortium, 2016, p. 22). If a terrorist group seeks to target American citizens generally, rather
than particular individuals (i.e., a prominent politician or business person), then the attack is not
an assassination since the target is not specific enough. An assassination is considered successful
if the intended target is killed. If an attack results in the target being injured but not killed, or in
other individuals being killed, the GTD considers the incident unsuccessful. This definition
highlights how the tactic of assassination is distinguished from terrorist attacks due to its unique
target type. Assassinations target specific individuals, while other types of terrorist attacks often
target locations, structures, or general groups or categories of people.
Assassinations included in the GTD must also align with the GTD’s definition of
terrorism, which is defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a nonstate actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or
intimidation” (National Consortium, 2016, p. 8). The GTD’s inclusion criteria also require that
two of the following criteria are satisfied: “1) The act must be aimed at attaining a political,
economic, religious, or social goal, 2) There must be evidence of an intention to coerce,
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intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate
victims, 3) The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities” (National
Consortium, 2016, p. 9).

History of Assassination
Origins of Assassination
The term “assassin” comes from a radical Muslim Shi’a terrorist group that fought the
Christian Crusaders between 1090 and 1272 and used the assassination tactic to achieve its
political objectives (Leiden, 1969; Hoffman, 1995). In fact, some argue that this Ismaili Shi’a
sect were some of history’s first terrorists (Lewis, 2008). A central figure in this terrorist group
was Hassan-I Sabbah, who exploited the psychological impact of terror by requiring his assassins
to attack with daggers in intimate and violent clashes (Bogosian, 2015). The word “assassin”
stems from an Arabic word meaning “hasish-eater”, which refers to the tradition of assassins
taking hashish right before they attacked (Leiden, 1969; Hoffman, 1995). Assassins were
motivated by the belief that the assassination was a “divine duty”, and they would go directly to
heaven if they were killed during the attack (Hoffman, 1995). The idea of the suicide martyr that
exists in some radical jihadist Islamist terrorist organizations today can therefore be traced back
to these original assassins (Hoffman, 1995).
The assassination tactic greatly benefited from technological advances in weapons
technology during the nineteenth-century’s Industrial Revolution. These technological
improvements ensured that attacks were more deadly and thus successful (Bogosian, 2015). The
development of the machine gun, handgun and explosives assisted revolutionaries in their use of
assassinations to inflict political change. These new technologies helped further the cause of the
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Russian left-wing group known as The People’s Will when they assassinated Tsar Alexander II
in 1881 as well as the Bolsheviks when they killed Tsar Nicholas II decades later (Bogosian,
2015). Organized groups seeking to further some political objective increasingly relied on the
assassination tactic in the nineteenth-century (Gross, 1969). These groups frequently directed
terror at prominent political leaders they viewed as oppressors (Gross, 1969). In the decades
preceding World War I, world leaders were assassinated at a rapid pace, as prime ministers,
presidents, and kings from the United States, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Persia, France,
Austria, Ecuador, and Austro-Hungary were killed (Bogosian, 2015).

Impact of Assassination: Examples
Terrorists frequently employ assassinations to achieve their goals, with roughly 17,000
incidents recorded by the GTD since 1970 (National Consortium, 2015). Assassinations not only
cause internal unrest and instability within a country, but also contribute to international
conflicts. History is full of examples illustrating the extensive influence a successful
assassination can have.
One of the most prominent incidents is the 1914 assassination of the heir to the AustroHungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. In June 2014, the Archduke planned a visit to the
Bosnian capital of Sarajevo with his wife Sophie. Despite having received several warnings of
the danger that existed in Sarajevo and having been urged by the Emperor and his chamberlain to
cancel the trip, the Archduke refused to postpone the visit (Lebow, 2000). On the morning of
June 28, the Archduke arrived in Sarajevo and was driving to the Town Hall when a Serbian
nationalist threw a grenade at his car. The bomb missed the Archduke’s car and exploded nearby
injuring two officers in the following car along with some bystanders (“Heir to Austria’s throne,”
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1914). After the explosion, the Archduke insisted on continuing his visit (Lebow, 2000). During
his return from the Town Hall, a member of the Serbian nationalist group known as the Black
Hand, Gavrilo Princip, emerged from the crowd and fired on the Archduke and his wife in their
vehicle, killing them instantly (Levinson, 2005; Weissman, Busch, & Schouten, 2014; Bogosian,
2015). In the days following the attack, the impact of the event was seen in newspapers
throughout the world. The British newspaper, The Morning Post, declared that the assassination
of the Archduke was an act of aggression that “was to serve as a pretext for the assassination of a
nation” (Watt, 1971, p. 246). Historians maintain that the assassination of the Archduke was the
single event that triggered World War I, thus changing history (Lebow, 2000; Weissman et al.,
2014).
Another example is the March 16, 1978 kidnapping of former Italian Prime Minister
Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades, a left-wing terrorist organization. After abducting Moro, the
Red Brigades declared that Moro is “Only our first victim. We shall hit at the heart of the state”
(“Aldo Moro”, 1978). When the Italian government did not meet their demands to release 13
extremist prisoners, the group assassinated Moro on May 9th, leaving his body in an abandoned
car in the heart of Rome (Moss, 1981). Moro’s murder was representative of the growing
political violence perpetrated by several Italian terrorist groups during the early 1970’s. The
event demonstrates how terrorists use the assassination tactic to inflict symbolic and physical
harm to achieve their objectives. Moro was a symbolic target, he led one Italy’s major parties,
and his death severely impacted the Italian government (Gumbel, 1998).
The 1984 assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi exemplifies the
preferences of terrorists to attack symbolic targets to convey a political message. On October 31,
Gandhi’s two Sikh bodyguards killed her in the morning as she walked to her garden on her way
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to work. As she passed the gate, her guards opened fire on her with a handgun and automatic
weapon. It is largely believed that her assassination was in response to the Indian Army’s
Operation Blue Star in June of 1984, which greatly damaged the Sikh Golden Temple (Stevens,
1984). Although Gandhi had been under heightened security, it has been alleged that her
secretary dismissed an order from intelligence and security officials to remove Sikh policemen,
including the guards who eventually murdered her, as a security precaution (Hazarika, 1989). In
the minutes following Gandhi’s assassination, soldiers killed one of the perpetrators, Beant
Singh, while guards arrested the second perpetrator (Stevens, 1984). Gandhi not only represented
a highly symbolic target whose assassination would have a significant impact, but she also
represented a relatively easy target since her bodyguards had personal access to her.
Organized criminal groups have also used the assassination tactic. This is seen in the
mafia’s murder on May 23, 1992 of the Italian prosecutor and judge, Giovanni Falcone who was
intimately involved in overthrowing the mafia’s power and influence in Sicily. In the months
following Falcone’s assassination, the mafia murdered another prominent Italian judge, Paolo
Borsellino. While the mafia is not typically considered a terrorist organization, the Falcone and
Borsellino murders align with the GTD definition of terrorism and are therefore categorized as
terrorist attacks in the GTD. Scholars note the historical impact of the Falcone and Borsellino
assassinations, and credit these murders for triggering the anti-mafia movement throughout Italy
and Europe (Fijuaut, 2012).
The serious consequences that an assassination can inflict are illustrated by the June 1993
murder of Melchior Ndadye, the first democratically elected president of Burundi (Appleton,
2000). The Ndadye assassination was notable because the democratization of Burundi had been
considered exemplary until his death (Bundervoet, 2009). In just a few months following
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Ndadye’s election, a group of Tutsi paratroopers attempted to stage a coup by attacking his
residence and killing him along with several ministers (Bundervoet, 2009). His murder
ultimately sparked a civil war that lasted 13 years and resulted in over 200,000 deaths (Appleton,
2000; Bundervoet, 2009). The civil war substantially impacted Burundi’s economy and
infrastructure (Bundervoet, 2009).
A more recent example of a successful assassination event is the December 12, 2016
murder of Russia’s ambassador to Turkey, Andrey G. Karlov, by a 22-year-old off-duty police
officer. Karlov had been speaking at an art exhibit in Ankara when the apparent ISIS
sympathizer, who was angry over Russia’s involvement in Syria, killed him. The gunman was
subsequently killed by Turkish Special Forces responding to the attack (Arango & Gladstone,
2016). Immediately following this incident, many argued that the attack could weaken the
relationship between Russia and Turkey, while others maintained that it could instead strengthen
both countries’ determination in fighting terrorism. Turkish President Erdogan even emphasized
that the attack was a “provocation” aimed at destroying “the normalization process of Turkey–
Russia relations” (Arango & Gladstone, 2016). U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry noted the
international scope of the attack by stating that the assassination was an “assault on the right of
all diplomats to safely and securely advance and represent their nations around the world”
(Arango & Gladstone, 2016). The murder of Karlov is an example of how the tactic of
assassination can be used by terrorists to inflict fear and uncertainty in an attacked country.
These examples illustrate that successful assassination incidents can have considerable
domestic as well as international implications (Felthous, 2014). The potential to inflict such a
substantial impact on a country by murdering one prominent individual, as opposed to large
numbers of civilians, makes the tactic particularly appealing to terrorists.
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Links to Terrorism
Several similarities and differences appear to exist between the original assassins and the
terrorists operating today. Similarities include the deliberate use of terror, the loyalty and
dedication of the individual carrying out an attack, the notion of self-sacrifice for a higher cause,
and the reward of ascending to heaven after death (Lewis, 2008). Another similarity between the
medieval assassins and modern terrorists is the use of attacks to inflict psychological terror
among victims (Bogosian, 2015). While some scholars claim that an additional similarity lies in
how both attacks have been aimed at an external enemy (i.e., Crusaders v. Americans), others
counter that since medieval assassins were mainly concerned with attacking Muslims, this is a
difference and not a similarity (Lewis, 2008). Other differences between the original assassins
and current terrorists can be seen in their victims. The medieval assassins tended to attack rulers
and leaders that represented the existing order they sought to overthrow, and in contrast to
modern terrorists, never attacked ordinary people (Lewis, 2008). The original assassins thus
attacked individuals that represented the most challenging and protected targets (Lewis, 2008),
while terrorists today often prefer to attack accessible targets (Clarke & Newman, 2006). While
the original assassins used daggers to attack their victims (Lewis, 2008), terrorists today use less
personal weapons that allow for distance between themselves and their victims, such as firearms
and explosives (Bogosian, 2015).
Although similarities have been noted between the original assassins and today’s suicide
bombers, Lewis (2008) argues that an important difference exists between the two that has been
blurred by twentieth-century theologians whose interpretations have influenced the suicide
bombers operating today. This difference is that Islam has always regarded suicide as a major sin
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and there is a distinction between involving oneself in a situation where death is inevitable “at
the hands of an overwhelmingly strong enemy” compared to “dying by one’s own hand” (Lewis,
2008, p. XII).
Similarities and differences can be observed between terrorism and assassination as a
tactic. Felthous (2014) notes the similarities in how governments respond to both terrorist and
assassination attacks. There are also parallels regarding the impact of terrorist attacks and
assassinations. Like other terrorist acts, assassinations can intimidate enemies and the public
generally through media coverage (Jenkins, 1981; Wilkinson, 1997). Similar to how ideological
and political motivations are tied to the actions of terrorist organizations, assassinations
historically have also been driven by political factors. For example, political motivations were
behind the murder of Julius Caesar as well as the assassinations of Japanese Prime Ministers
Hamaguchi and Inukai prior to World War II (Crotty, 1998). Once a Prince came to power
during the Ottoman Empire, all of his brothers and male cousins were killed to prevent them
from threatening the throne in the future (Bogosian, 2015). Crotty's (1998) typology of U.S.
assassinations expands upon the connection between terrorism and the tactic. One of Crotty’s
five assassination categories includes terroristic assassination. Crotty (1998) explains that
terroristic assassinations are used by both governments to suppress insurgents, as well as
revolutionary and organized groups to weaken governments. Assassinations have also been used
during warfare. The Nazis frequently employed this tactic during World War II and the Viet
Cong used it during the Vietnam War (Crotty, 1998).
While acknowledging that political assassination is a form of terrorism, Ben-Yehuda
(1990) calls for studying it as a distinct empirical unit since it represents a specific form of
violence. Importantly, assassinations can be distinguished from other forms of terrorism by their
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targets. The target of an assassination is a specific individual, while other terrorism targets are
not (Ben-Yehuda, 1990). Ben-Yehuda (1990) argues that this distinction between assassinations
and terrorism tends to be overlooked by researchers and warrants further attention. This
difference between assassinations and other forms of terrorism supports a key element of the
SCP approach, which emphasizes the importance of crime specificity (Clarke & Newman, 2006).
For example, preventing a rape is very different from preventing a robbery, and preventing a
kidnapping varies from preventing a suicide bombing (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Freilich &
Newman, 2009). Accordingly, it is important to examine specific forms of terrorism, like
assassinations, to understand the processes that influence their occurrence and to best prevent
and disrupt these attacks (Clarke & Newman, 2006).

Current Assassination Literature
This dissertation focuses on assassinations committed by terrorists, and excludes other
types of assassinations. Interestingly, few studies have examined assassinations carried out by
terrorists. In fact, attacks targeting public officials were largely absent from academic research in
the U.S. until 1964, when the Warren Commission renewed interest in political assassination
(Farnham & Busch, 2016). Even after 1964, the topic tended to be ignored by researchers until
the 1980’s (Dietz & Martell, 2010). Dietz and Martell (2010) note, however, that in the period
prior to the 1980s, the empirical studies on assassinations and the individuals who target public
figures mainly focused on psychotic visitors to government buildings like the White House.
Assassinations therefore represent an understudied tactic in the terrorism literature, while other
tactics, like suicide attacks and aerial hijackings, have typically received more attention.
Currently, the assassination literature mostly focuses on the political and cultural impact of
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attacks on countries attacked, as well as the psychological impact on individual citizens.
Psychologists, political scientists and historians usually conduct these assassination studies,
while criminologists rarely engage this issue.
Since scholars emphasize that an interdisciplinary approach is valuable in assessing the
threat against prominent individuals (Felthous, 2016), the use of criminological theories can
further assist researchers and practitioners in understanding this phenomenon. In addition,
studies often examine the individual-level characteristics of assassins (i.e., psychological and
behavioral factors) that motivated them to commit the assassination. The assassination event
itself, importantly, is rarely the central focus, and studies usually apply qualitative as opposed to
quantitative methods. Since criminological approaches are lacking in the literature, especially in
the context of terrorism, an emphasis on the environmental and situational factors that facilitate
assassinations is similarly lacking.
Although understudied, there are a few quantitative investigations of assassination
incidents. Nice (1994) finds that certain political conditions contribute to assassination attempts
on U.S. presidents. The likelihood of an attack is facilitated by the advent of the modern
presidency as a symbol of importance and power along with its increased visibility by the public
(Nice, 1994). Periods of partisan realignments along with war are also associated with
presidential assassination attempts. Iqbal and Zorn (2006) empirically examine assassination
incidents of heads of state between 1946 and 2000. They look at institutional and sociopolitical
factors and find that assassinations are related to the manner in which a leader takes and stays in
office, the amount of power that they exert in office, and the degree of repressiveness they rule
with (Iqbal & Zorn, 2006). Other studies analyze how lone-wolf terrorists compare to assassins
and school attackers (McCauley, Moskalenko & Van Son, 2013; McCauley & Moskalenko,
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2014). McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2014) study highlights the importance of both opportunity
and means in their examination of the common characteristics of assassins and school attackers.
They discover four main shared characteristics: grievance, depression, unfreezing (i.e., a
personal disconnect), and weapons use outside of the military. They argue that grievance offers a
motive for violence, while weapons experience provides the means. Lastly, depression and
unfreezing lower the opportunity cost involved for those engaging violence. Mandala (2017)
quantitatively analyzed terrorist assassinations and suicide attacks through the “root causes”
framework, and finds some country-level conditions to be uniquely associated with either
assassinations or suicide attacks, while some are associated with both attack types.
Many researchers examine assassination case studies and find that attacks can have
serious political ramifications for attacked countries (Crotty, 1998). The assassination of a
government figure can disrupt and threaten democracy (Vossekuil, Borum, Fein, & Reddy,
2001), which contributes to the impression that an attacked country is politically unstable
(Hurwitz, 1973). One example of the political consequences resulting from an assassination is
the murder of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro that ended the Historic Compromise in
Italy, a controversial agreement that would have created a coalition between the Christian
Democrats and the Italian Communist Party (Gumbel, 1998). In another example, Yitzhak
(2010) discusses how the assassination of Jordan’s King Abdallah in 1951 challenged his
nation’s stability as the leaders felt immediately threatened by the Palestinians as well as other
Arab nations. Successful assassinations can directly influence the government’s operation. For
instance, in the United States, the office of the presidency has been held for over 20 years by
presidents who took office as a direct result of their predecessor’s assassination (Appleton,
2000). Research finds that presidents who come to office following an assassination can
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encounter unique challenges in establishing their legitimacy (Abbott, 2005). Kazemzadeh and
Eid (2008) focus on the possible political ramifications for identifying the assassin of Lebanese
Hezbollah Commander Imad Mughniyah.
In addition to an assassination’s political consequences, it can also traumatize a nation’s
citizenry. Several researchers highlight the domestic or cultural trauma that results in an attacked
country after an unexpected and shocking assassination. One example is the 1948 assassination
of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, which Debs (2013) contends was responsible for producing such a
cultural trauma. Researchers note that the assassinations of President Lincoln, President
McKinley and President Kennedy had a traumatic impact on the population and led to the office
of the U.S. presidency being seen by many as a sacred cultural object (Schwartz, 1991; Childers,
2013). Similarly, Türkmen-Dervişoğlu (2013) analyzes the cultural trauma provoked in Turkey
following the 2007 assassination of the well-known Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink.
Scholars note how political assassinations often evoke many different emotional
responses among citizens who feel threatened by the attack (Varma, Chandiramani, Rao, Bhave,
& Kaur, 1989). President Kennedy’s assassination, for example, had a deep psychological impact
on American citizens (Ebel-Lam, Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Jones, 2010). Freedman (1984) finds
that many Americans identified the assassination of President Kennedy as the equivalent of their
own father being murdered. In fact, many Americans were actually more depressed following the
president’s murder than they were when their own father died. Similarly, researchers have noted
the traumatizing impact that the 1995 assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had
on the Israeli population (Klingman, 2001; Zelig & Nachson, 2012). Assassinations of important
political figures can also leave a lasting impression on citizens’ memories (Appleton, 2000; Zelig
& Nachson, 2012). One study finds that the 1994 assassination of Mexican presidential candidate
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Luis Donaldo Colosio caused acute stress reactions among citizens (Maldonado et al., 2002).
Results further indicate that individuals do not need to be physically present to experience the
psychological effects of an assassination (i.e., they can watch the attack on television). More
recently, researchers contend that the June 16, 2016 attack on British Labour Party politician Jo
Cox was seen by many as a “catastrophic shock and horrific loss” for not only the UK, but also
for the world (Felthous, 2016, p. 602-603).
Many studies focus on the individuals responsible for threatening or carrying out an
attack on a public official. In response to the threat posed to public figures, various threat
assessment units have been formed throughout the world to detect and respond to alarming
behavior (Guldimann, Brunner, Schmid, & Habermeyer, 2016). James and Farnham (2016)
explain that these groups have mainly been formed as a response to the risk posed to public
officials by lone actors. In the U.S., such threat assessment groups exist in the Capitol Police
(Scalora & Zimmerman, 2015; James & Farnham, 2016), the Secret Service (Phillips, 2006;
James and Farnham, 2016), and the LAPD Threat Assessment Unit (Scalora & Zimmerman,
2015). The Fixated Threat Assessment Centre (FTAC) was formed to address threats in the U.K.
(James & Farnham, 2016), and the Threat Assessment Unit of the Netherlands National Police
Agency was also formed to address threats to public officials (van der Meer, Bootsma, & Meloy,
2012; James & Farnham, 2016).
Scholars have investigated the role of mental illness in individual threateners and
assassins of prominent figures. Researchers find that most assassins of U.S. government officials
were mentally ill (Meloy et al., 2004). For example, President Reagan’s and President Clinton’s
attempted assassins both suffered from emotional and mental deficits (Clarke & Lucente, 2003;
Goldstein, 1981; Rosenzweig, 1981). Logan et al. (1984) stress the role of mental illness in their
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analysis of U.S. presidential threateners who received court-ordered psychiatric evaluations.
Despite the known presence of mental and emotional disorders in U.S. presidential assassins,
Felthous (1985) finds that historically, these individuals have been punished severely. Mental
illness has been found to be a significant factor in individuals that attack other public figures
(Guldimann, et al., 2016). In their study of public figure attackers in the U.S., Meloy and
Amman (2016) discover that most incidents are not politically motivated. However, the authors
admit that it was difficult to unravel ideology and mental illness.
Scalora and Zimmerman (2015) find that the Threat Assessment Section of the U.S.
Capitol Police encounter a substantial number of individuals suffering from serious mental
illness. In their analysis of individuals who inappropriately contact members of Congress in the
U.S., Scalora et al. (2002a) note a significant presence of mentally ill individuals. However, they
emphasize that the presence of mental illness alone is not necessarily predictive of violence.
Instead, other variables like type of symptomatology and treatment compliance are more likely to
predict violence. In a study that specifically examined the role of pre-contact behavior in
individuals that inappropriately contacted members of the U.S. Congress or their staff members,
Scalora et al. (2002b) discover that almost half of those who approached their targets had
engaged in pre-attack contact behavior. In another study of inappropriate contacts to members of
Congress, Schoeneman-Morris et al. (2007) specifically compare letter vs. email writers. The
authors find that letter writers are more likely than email writers to show signs of mental illness
and thus appear to pose a greater threat. Calhoun (2001) analyzes violence committed against
judicial officials in the U.S., and explains how this violence is distinguishable from violence
against other public officials. Calhoun (2001) concludes that individuals who threaten judges are
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different because they do not seek infamy from killing the official. Instead, they attack out of
anger or revenge against the system that the official personifies.
The lack of political motivation that characterizes U.S. presidential assassins
distinguishes the U.S. from other developed countries where assassins instead tend to be
politically driven (Heyman, 1984; Crotty, 1998; Clarke & Lucente, 2003; Felthous, 2016). The
fact that relatively few assassinations motivated by terrorism have occurred in the U.S. may also
contribute to the scant literature focusing on terrorist assassinations. Fein and Vossekuil (1999)
explain that the traditional goal of an assassination on a national leader is to eliminate the
individual and/or place a different individual into that position of power to essentially change
who controls the government. The authors contend that in a constitutional democracy like the
U.S., however, an assassination of a national leader will not achieve this political goal.
Clarke and Lucente (2003) discuss the typology used by the U.S. Secret Service to
classify presidential assassins. Only one of this typology’s four categories (Type I) accounts for
political extremist motivations while the remaining three categories (Type II, III, and IV)
account for varying degrees of emotional and mental disorders. Using a clinical context, Phillips
(2006) expands the U.S. Secret Service classification to five categories to describe the
motivations of presidential stalkers and assassins. These categories include: resentful,
pathologically obsessed, infamy seeking, intimacy seeking, and nuisance or attention seeking.
Here too none of Phillips’ (2006) categories account for political motivations.
Even though pathological motivations behind U.S. political assassins tend to be unique to
the U.S., emotionally disturbed individuals have carried out assassinations in other countries. For
example, the assassin responsible for murdering Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna
Lindh in 2003 had a history of psychological disorders (Unsgaard & Meloy, 2011). Van der
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Meer et al. (2012) analyze the individuals referred to the Threat Assessment Unit in the
Netherlands for engaging in problematic approaches or communications with the Dutch Royal
Family. They find that the majority of subjects were mentally ill. Pathé, Lowry, Haworth,
Winterbourne, and Day (2016) examine individuals referred to a fixated threat assessment center
in Queensland, Australia and discover that almost half of the cases involved seriously mentally
ill individuals. Importantly, the authors conclude that it is important to provide mental health
care to such individuals to prevent future problematic behavior. In fact, more than 75% of the
mentally ill individuals did not receive mental health care. In their study of individuals who have
shown abnormal attentions toward the British Royal Family, Darnley et al. (2010) find that
individuals who approach, compared to those who only communicate, with their targets are more
likely to have a serious mental illness. Lone-actors, individuals not affiliated with an organized
terrorist group, often play a role in assassinations and attacks on public officials (Farnham &
Busch, 2016). While studies typically conclude that members of terrorist groups usually are not
mentally ill, lone-actors are significantly more likely to have a mental illness (Corner & Gill,
2015; Farnham & Busch, 2016; Gruenewald, Chermak & Freilich, 2013). Similar to U.S.
presidential assassins, lone-actor terrorists are also more likely to be socially isolated (Corner &
Gill, 2015). One analysis of lone-wolf attacks suggests that lone actors are less successful than
organized terrorist groups (Jasparro, 2010). Another study shows that the success of lone actors
is highly dependent on the opportunities present and their ability to adapt to changing
surroundings (Gill & Corner, 2016).
In sum, a criminological perspective is rarely used to study assassination as a terrorist
tactic. The current literature also lacks a focus on the assassination event itself, instead
concentrating on the political conditions surrounding an attack or resulting from it. The literature
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also concentrates on the psychological impact attacks can have on citizens, along with the mental
and emotional characteristics of individual assassins and those who threaten public figures.
Research has yet to quantitatively examine the environmental conditions and situational
opportunities that facilitate successful assassination events. To fill this gap, this dissertation
applies criminological opportunity theories (i.e., rational choice, routine activities, and crime
pattern) that emphasize the crime event, rather than the individual offender, to study terrorist
assassinations.

CH. 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
There is a growing body of research applying a criminological lens to terrorism,
especially through the framework of environmental criminology and SCP (LaFree & Freilich,
2016). LaFree and Hendrickson (2007) explain that although criminologists have been slow to
study terrorism, a criminological approach can greatly benefit the fight against terrorism by
assisting our understanding of terrorist behavior and the practices for processing terrorists. The
authors highlight that crime and terrorism are often connected since many terrorists must engage
in crime to further their objectives (see also Hamm, 2007).

Environmental Criminology & SCP:
Environmental criminology stresses the importance of the crime event and examining the
opportunities that facilitate the crime to occur. In comparison, traditional criminology theories
tend to emphasize the offender and distal causes of crime (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008).
Studying the interaction between the offender and his/her environment assists in the formulation
of effective prevention measures (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008). Environmental criminology is
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influenced by three opportunity theories: routine activities, rational choice, and crime pattern
(Clarke, 2008). Routine activities looks at how crime occurs through the intersection in time and
space of 1) a likely offender, 2) a suitable target, and 3) the absence of a capable guardian. It also
takes into account handlers (of offenders) and place managers (of locations) (Cohen & Felson,
1979; Felson & Cohen, 1980; Felson, 2008; Scott, Eck, Knutsson, & Goldstein, 2008). Rational
choice examines how offenders make decisions, maintaining that criminal behavior is purposive,
rational, and there are different stages of criminal involvement (Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Cornish
& Clarke, 1987). In addition, rational choice emphasizes how the decision-making processes of
offenders are crime-specific (Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Cornish & Clarke, 1987). Crime pattern
theory maintains that crimes do not occur randomly, but instead unfold when there is a
convergence of both the offender and victim’s environment. In addition, the theory maintains
that crime is concentrated in hot spot areas with crime attractors and crime generators present
(Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993).
SCP is influenced by all three of these crime opportunity theories (Clarke, 2008). SCP
seeks to alter the opportunities and environment surrounding a specific criminal event to prevent
it (Clarke, 2008). A central element of this approach is the disaggregation and analysis of
specific forms of crime from broader crime categories. Like crime, different forms of terrorism
must be considered separately. Suicide bombings in restaurants are very different from those
occurring in buses and should therefore be analyzed separately (Newman & Clarke, 2007).
Similarly, the conditions facilitating suicide bombings differ greatly from those enabling areal
hijackings (Newman & Clarke, 2007). The importance of distinguishing between different types
of terrorist attacks can be seen in the 9/11 Commission Report. The Commission describes how
before the attacks on 9/11, the airlines were mainly concerned with the threats posed by areal
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hijackings in the traditional sense and of bombs being placed in passenger luggage. The
possibility of airplanes being used as suicide bombs was never considered, and therefore the pre9/11 security measures were unable to disrupt this attack type.
Through the focus on crime specificity, SCP seeks to inform prevention measures that
reduce opportunities for crime by increasing the risks and difficulties for offenders as well as
reducing their rewards (Clarke, 1995). Clarke (2008) notes that sometimes only one small
element of a criminal opportunity needs to be eliminated for a crime to be successfully
prevented. Thus, a focus on understanding the steps and processes behind how a criminal event
takes place helps inform prevention measures (Clarke, 2008). Cornish’s (1994) crime scripts
argues that the crime commission process usually consists of several steps. Cornish (1994)
maintains that crime scripts can be developed for various forms of crime to explain how each
unfolds and how offenders make decisions. An understanding of how a crime unfolds helps
develop specific interventions and crime prevention measures that can be utilized at various
stages of the crime.
Cornish and Clarke’s (2003) most recent formulation of SCP includes 25 techniques for
disrupting both crime opportunities and offender motivation cues (Figure 1). They propose 5
techniques for each of the 5 main themes of 1) Increasing the effort, 2) Increasing the risks, 3)
Reducing the rewards, 4) Reducing provocations, and 5) Removing excuses. Examples of
techniques that fall into the “increase the effort” concept include target hardening, while those
directed toward “increasing the risks” include extending guardianship and strengthening formal
surveillance (Cornish & Clarke, 2003; Clarke, 2008). Techniques for reducing offender rewards
include removing and concealing targets, while those directed towards reducing provocations
include neutralizing peer pressure and avoiding disputes (Cornish & Clarke, 2003; Clarke, 2008).
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Finally, examples of techniques for removing excuses include setting rules and posting
instructions (Cornish & Clarke, 2003; Clarke, 2008).
Figure 1: 25 Techniques of Situational Prevention

Source: Cornish and Clarke (2003), p. 90

Terrorism & SCP
Some argue that SCP is a more effective counterterrorism strategy compared to other
approaches that focus on the apprehension and interrogation of terrorist suspects (Freilich &
Newman, 2009; Newman & Clarke, 2007; Felson & Clarke, 1997). In addition, SCP can be seen
as a more ethical and efficient strategy compared to others that rely mainly on the targeting of
terrorists through drone strikes. Several studies are beginning to apply this framework to
terrorism to inform the development of counterterrorism interventions (Lum & Koper, 2011).
This trend is influenced by Clarke and Newman’s (2006) book Outsmarting the Terrorists,
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which called for the application of SCP to terrorism by tailoring SCP’s 25 techniques to the
terrorism context. They call this reformulation the “Four Principles of Situational Prevention and
Four Pillars of Opportunity”. The “Four Pillars” include the following opportunities: facilitating
conditions, targets, weapons, and tools (Clarke & Newman, 2006).
The “Four Principles” are similar to the topics included in the 25 techniques of SCP, and
include: increasing the effort, increasing the risks, reducing the rewards, and reducing
provocations and excuses (Clarke & Newman, 2006). When targets are symbolic or easy for
terrorists to attack, target opportunities exist (Newman & Clarke, 2010). Terrorists have weapons
opportunities when they have experience with particular types of weapons, or when attacks
require specific types of weapons to be successful (Newman & Clarke, 2010). Tools that enable
attacks, like credit cards and cars, are opportunity tools, while societal environments like
communities sympathetic to terrorists are referred to as facilitating conditions (Newman &
Clarke, 2010). Clarke and Newman (2006) expand this framework’s application to terrorism with
their development of the EVIL DONE acronym to identify the most vulnerable targets to a
terrorist attack. They note that vulnerable targets are those that are Exposed, Vital, Iconic,
Legitimate, Destructible, Occupied, Near and Easy. They also use the MURDEROUS acronym
to describe how terrorists select weapons that are Multipurpose, Undetectable, Removable,
Destructive, Enjoyable, Reliable, Obtainable, Uncomplicated, and Safe (Clarke & Newman,
2006).
Researchers have begun examining many of Clarke and Newman’s (2006) claims. Ekici,
Ozkan, Celik, and Maxfield (2008; see also Boba, 2009) apply EVIL DONE to assess target
attractiveness to terrorists in Turkey. Other researchers explore the effectiveness of target
hardening measures. Silke (2010) finds such measures to be effective at preventing terrorist
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attacks on the Olympics, but finds evidence of displacement where terrorists opt to instead attack
close to Olympic venues rather than the main sites that are protected. In another study, Perry,
Apel, Newman, and Clarke (2016) find that Israel’s West Bank Barrier effectively prevented
suicide bombings and other attacks. The authors also find no evidence of displacement, but
rather identify a diffusion of benefits effect. Specifically, fatalities and attacks were reduced in
sections where construction of the Barrier had not begun as well as on the Palestinian side of the
Barrier. Hsu and Apel (2015) find that the implementation of airport metal detectors prevented
hijackings and other types of aviation attacks. They also find evidence of a diffusion of benefits
to other types of attacks and targets.
In addition to the recent studies by Mandala and Freilich (2017a; 2017b) analyzing
terrorist assassinations through environmental criminology and SCP, studies have applied these
frameworks to a variety of terrorism types such as bioterrorism (Clark, 2009), kidnapping of
hostages (Yun, 2009), explosive attacks on railways (Meyer, 2012), airplane hijackings (Fahey,
LaFree, Dugan, & Piquero, 2012), and suicide bombings (Clarke & Newman, 2006). For
example, Perry and Hasisi (2015) note that individuals who engage in jihadist suicide terrorism
behave rationally by weighing the costs and benefits of their participation. The authors also find
no difference between the motivations of terrorists and those of other criminals. Others have
developed crime scripts for terrorist kidnappings (Yun, 2009), law enforcement murders by farright extremists (Freilich & Chermak, 2009), suicide bombings (Clarke & Newman, 2006) and
explosive attacks (Meyer, 2012). In particular, Yun (2009) explores SCP and terrorist hostage
taking in Afghanistan and finds that terrorists are influenced by situational factors at various
stages of the incident.
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Researchers are applying crime pattern theory by exploring the spatial and temporal
patterns of terrorist attacks. Johnson and Braithwaite (2009) find that IED and non-IED attacks
in Iraq cluster significantly in time and space. They also find that these patterns vary depending
on the attack type, indicating that different attacks may be influenced by different terrorist
strategies. This suggests that certain counterterrorism approaches may be more or less effective
depending on the type of attack (Johnson & Braithwaite, 2009). Interestingly, this finding
supports the importance of crime specificity maintained in SCP. In another SCP study on
insurgent activity in Iraq, Townsley, Johnson, and Ratcliffe (2008) note significant spatial
temporal clustering of IED attacks. Rossmo and Harries (2011) further find terrorist cell sites and
targets to be significantly clustered in Turkey. In particular, they find that terrorists rationally
choose locations for their cells that are not too far from their targets. Similarly, Berrebi and
Lakdawalla (2007) examine the spatial and temporal variation of Israeli terrorism incidents and
find that terrorists rationally select their targets by weighing both the costs and benefits. In a
recent study on IED attacks in Baghdad, researchers find evidence that attacks are geographically
clustered and are more likely to occur in areas with higher population, road density, and military
garrisons (Braithwaite & Johnson, 2015).
In sum, studies are increasingly utilizing an environmental criminology and SCP
framework to examine terrorism and different forms of attacks. This dissertation therefore
extends this literature by applying SCP and environmental criminology to study a very specific
form of terrorism: assassinations.
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CH. 3: HYPOTHESES
Klein, Gruenewald, and Smith (2016) discuss the recent effort by scholars to identify the
characteristics associated with successful terrorist attacks. Despite this effort, they note that there
are a limited number of studies, both inside and outside of criminology, that actually do so. This
section builds off of the SCP and environmental criminology framework and these few studies to
develop a series of hypotheses to identify the factors associated with successful terrorist
assassinations. Table 1 displays these hypotheses.
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Capable Guardians
As Clarke and Newman (2006) maintain, terrorist efforts can be thwarted by
implementing measures that increase the effort required to carry out an attack since terrorists are
more likely to attack targets seen as “easy”. Examples of “easy” targets are those that are
unsecured. In their examination of far-right terrorism incidents in the United States, Klein et al.
(2016) find that unsecured targets are significantly more likely to be involved in successful
attacks compared to secured targets. Similarly, in their study of eco-terrorism in the U.S. and
target attractiveness, Gruenewald, Allison-Gruenewald, and Klein (2015) find that eco-terrorists
prefer targets where access is gained without permission, and targets are unprotected by security.
Similarly, routine activities theory (Felson & Cohen, 1979) argues that crime is more likely when
guardians are absent. These findings and arguments lead to this study’s first hypothesis that:
Attacks where security guards are present are less likely to result in a successful assassination
compared to attacks where no security guards are present (H1).
Some argue that when the risk of apprehension or identification is increased, terrorists
may be less likely to engage in an attack (Clarke & Newman, 2006). Researchers also find that
law enforcement intervention is responsible for explaining why terrorists are sometimes
unsuccessful (Hamm, 2007; Klein et al., 2016; Dahl 2011). In fact, Dahl’s (2011) analysis of
foiled terrorist plots against U.S. targets, finds that not all plots necessarily failed due to
intelligence gathering or police investigation. Dahl (2011) instead maintains that some plots fail
when terrorists encounter alert and responsive law enforcement or security officials through
routine activities like traffic stops (see also Hamm, 2007). Gill and Corner (2016) further note
that the success of lone actor terrorists is partly dependent on whether or not security disrupt
their plots. In line with this research and the SCP technique of increasing the risks involved for
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terrorists to be captured, it is hypothesized that: Attacks where security guards are present and
respond are less likely to result in a successful assassination compared to attacks where no
security guards are present (H2).
As discussed, a key element to routine activities theory is that the absence of a capable
guardian creates an opportunity for crime to occur. Parkin and Freilich (2015) operationalize this
element of routine activities in their variable “Others Around”, which accounts for whether or
not individuals other than the victims and terrorists are present at the attack scene. When other
individuals are present, they are essentially public guardians that can disrupt or deter a successful
attack. Considering this literature, it is hypothesized that: Attacks where others are present at the
scene of the incident (i.e., individuals other than the terrorists and target) are less likely to be
successful compared to attacks where other individuals are not present (H3).

Weapons
Terrorist incidents involving conventional weapons are also more likely to be successful
than incidents requiring more sophisticated weapons. Klein et al. (2016) note that firearms are
considered especially simple to use as well as lethal. This aligns with Clarke and Newman’s
(2006) weapons opportunity pillar, along with the SCP techniques of increasing the effort and
reducing the rewards for terrorists. If terrorists have access to uncomplicated and easy to use
weapons, less effort is required for them to carry out a successful attack, thus increasing the
rewards they are likely to gain. This finding also aligns with the MURDEROUS acronym for
terrorist weapon selection, where terrorists prefer reliable, obtainable and uncomplicated
weapons. In fact, Legault and Hendrickson (2009) argue that firearms encompass each
MURDEROUS attribute, and that guns have historically been very popular among terrorists. In
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addition, in their development of the weapons opportunity pillar for terrorism, Newman and
Clarke (2010) maintain that terrorists choose their weapons depending on the type of attack they
plan to carry out. Thus, they will choose what they view to be the most appropriate weapon to
carry out a successful attack.
The applicability of SCP to terrorist selection of weapons in assassinations can be seen in
Unsgaard & Meloy's (2011) discussion of the U.S. Secret Service’s Exceptional Case Study
project that analyzed assassination attacks against U.S. public figures between 1949 and 1996.
They find that some sort of firearm was utilized in 81% of events (Unsgaard & Meloy, 2011). In
their study of public figure attackers in the U.S., Meloy and Amman (2016) similarly find that
firearms are used in the majority of cases. Both Bogosian’s (2015) depiction of the new
technologies developed during the Industrial Revolution that facilitated assassination attacks and
Legault’s (2009) notion that assassins choose weapons that are familiar, easy to use, and efficient
support Clarke and Newman’s (2006) arguments. Bogosian (2015) points out that the availability
and accuracy of handguns dramatically improved during this time period and as a result assisted
assassins by improving their likelihood of success. In further support of Clarke and Newman
(2006), researchers find that little training or skill is required to use a firearm, and firearms are
also inexpensive and relatively easy to acquire (Jasparro, 2010; Gill & Corner, 2016). Explosives
are also easier to detect than firearms (Jasparro, 2010).
Clarke and Newman (2006) highlight that suicide terrorism is more effective, i.e., deadly,
than non-suicide terrorism. Similarly, scholars have argued that suicide terrorists are particularly
effective in reaching their targets (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007; Crenshaw, 2007; Gambetta,
2006; Hassan, 2006; Hoffman, 2003). Hard targets, like public officials are thought to be more
difficult to reach because they are better protected than soft targets, often having armed guards
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on duty. This could increase the likelihood that offenders will be killed compared to attackers
striking at soft targets. These circumstances often lead attackers to choose to commit (or be
willing to accept) a suicide attack where there is no need to plan an escape, no need to worry
about capture and confession, and no need to devise strategies to safeguard the attacker from
harm or death. Suicide attackers have been described as the ultimate smart bomb that is effective
at reaching their target (Hoffman, 2003), and especially effective at penetrating hardened targets
(Freilich, Parkin, Gruenewald, & Chermak, 2018; Collard-Wexler, Pischedda, & Smith, 2014).
Considering this literature, the following three hypotheses are proposed: Attacks where suicide
bombs are used, as opposed to other types of explosives, are more likely to result in a successful
assassination (H4); Attacks where firearms are used, as opposed to explosives, are more likely to
result in a successful assassination (H5); and Attacks where magnetic “sticky” bombs are used
compared to other types of explosives are less likely to result in a successful assassination (H6).
In this study, explosives refer to explosive devices other than suicide bombs and sticky
bombs. To further clarify H6, sticky bombs are explosive devices attached either magnetically or
with adhesive tape to vehicles, usually underneath and near the gas tank (Johnston, Vetrone, &
Warner, 2012). They are typically detonated through the use of a cell phone and are thought to
be especially difficult to detect due to their small size (Johnston et al., 2012; Druzin, 2012).
While they are a type of explosive, they are thought to be more complex and difficult to build
than more basic types of explosives like roadside bombs (Druzin, 2012). These devices are
therefore thought to be more sophisticated and complicated to use and obtain compared to
firearms and other types of explosives.
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Targets
Clarke and Newman (2006) maintain that terrorists select targets that are not only seen as
symbolic but that are also exposed, destructible and easy (see their EVIL DONE acronym). This
supports the notion that government officials are less likely to be involved in successful attacks
compared to unofficial targets unaffiliated with the government (i.e., civilians) since government
officials are more likely to have security and guardians in place to protect themselves. While
politicians may be at a greater risk of stalking and harassment than other individuals due to their
public visibility (Every-Palmer, Barry-Walsh, & Pathé, 2015), targets with security are less
likely to be “easy” to attack given their protection. Gill and Corner (2016) contend that
government targets, like police and politicians, are more target-hardened than non-government
targets. They find that the success of lone actor terrorists partly depends on whether or not they
have easy access to their target (Gill & Corner, 2016). In a study of public figure attackers in the
U.S., Meloy and Amman (2016) find that politicians are at the greatest risk for a successful
attack, followed by athletes and judges. They further discover that government officials
(politicians and judges) are at a lower risk of being attacked compared to all non-governmental
targets. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: Attacks that focus on unofficial targets (i.e.,
targets not affiliated with the government, like tourists, civilians, and journalists), thought to be
less secure and more destructible, are more likely to result in a successful assassination
compared to official targets (like police, diplomats and military officials) (H7).
Parkin and Freilich (2015) apply routine activities and lifestyle theories to examine the
characteristics of victims of ideologically motivated, and non-ideologically motivated, homicides
by far-right extremists in the U.S. They use this framework to explore the relationship between
various variables and ideologically and non-ideologically motivated homicides (Parkin &
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Freilich, 2015). These variables include: whether the victim was attacked at home, work, or
while engaging in work activities, and whether the attack occurred inside or outside. They find
that ideological victims are more likely to be killed outside during their routine activities, and
that victims of non-ideological attacks are more likely to be attacked inside and in a home
(Parkin & Freilich, 2015). Meloy and Allman (2016) analyze public figure attackers in the U.S.
between 1995 and 2015 and find that most attack locations depend on situational factors. Attacks
tend to occur at places where “a reasonable person” can expect to find the target (p. 635). In
particular, they find that politicians and judges are mostly attacked at work, while popular culture
figures are attacked at home.
Given these results and the SCP literature, this study proposes that assassination targets
are more likely to have security in place at their homes and places of work compared to when
they are outside. In addition, it is proposed that when targets are located inside buildings or other
structures, more effort is required for terrorists to reach them compared to if the target is outside.
It is also proposed that a motor vehicle offers a form of protection that will safeguard a target if
attacked. The motor vehicle can not only assist a target in evading and escaping an attack, but the
vehicle itself can protect the target from an explosion or armed assault, especially if it has
additional protection measures in place like bullet-resistant glass and reinforced doors. In line
with these findings and the routine activities literature, the following hypotheses are proposed:
Attacks that occur inside a building or structure are less likely to be successful than attacks that
occur outside of physical buildings or structures (H8); Attacks that occur at the target’s place of
work are less likely to be successful than those that occur outside of physical buildings or
structures (H9); Attacks that occur at the target’s home are less likely to be successful than those
that occur outside of physical buildings or structures (H10), and Attacks that occur while the
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target is in a motor vehicle or motorcycle are less likely to be successful than attacks where the
target is outside of a physical building or structure (H11).
Related to H11, there are additional protection measures that can be implemented during
motor vehicle travel to help prevent against successful attacks, such as the utilization of a
motorcade. Thus, it is hypothesized that Attacks that occur while the target is traveling in a
motorcade are less likely to be successful than attacks were there is no motorcade involved
(H12). The idea is that a motorcade provides the target with extra protection. A motorcade is
operationalized as including more than one vehicle present to confuse potential attackers as to
the exact automobile their target is in. Motorcades also usually have security personnel, i.e.,
guardians, present. This strategy is often seen when high-ranking government officials, such as
prime ministers and presidents, travel by motor vehicle. Thus, in line with SCP, a motorcade
increases the effort required by terrorists to correctly identify the vehicle their target is in during
an attack. It also increases the risks involved for terrorists, as there are capable guardians present,
thus making fewer opportunities present for terrorists to successfully attack the target.

Terrorists
Again, Clarke and Newman’s (2006) Four Pillars of Opportunity include tools like credit
cards and motor vehicles. These tools are everyday items that assist terrorists in planning and
carrying out attacks. Since motor vehicles and motorcycles are examples of tools frequently used
by terrorists, it is hypothesized that Incidents where terrorists attack from inside a motor vehicle,
or while riding a motorcycle, are more likely to result in successful assassinations compared to
incidents where terrorists attack while outside (i.e., outside a building or structure; not in a
motorcade) (H13). The argument is that the motor vehicle or motorcycle serves as a tool for
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terrorists to not only approach their target, but to also increase their likelihood of escaping
capture compared to if they did not use a vehicle. The fact that automobiles and motorcycles are
used by terrorists during attacks also illustrates how the use of a motorcade, described above, can
protect a target. Similar to how a building or structure can provide extra protection to a target,
buildings can also guard and shield terrorists during an assassination. This leads to the next
hypothesis: Incidents where terrorists attack from inside a building or structure are more likely
to result in a successful assassination compared to incidents where terrorists attack from outside
a physical building or structure (H14).

Attack Intensity
In an analysis of terrorist hostage-taking events, researchers find that the number of
fatalities occurring during an attack strongly predict whether or not an attack is successful (Klein
et al., 2016; Sandler & Scott, 1987). Other researchers note that attacks tend to occur in areas
with a high population density, since they facilitate an attack’s success by providing both more
people and target opportunities (Medina, Siebeneck, & Hepner, 2011; Braithwaite & Johnson,
2015). Clarke and Newman (2006) also note that terrorists usually seek to obtain high casualties
in attacks by attacking occupied targets. In accordance with this literature, along with the
definition of a successful assassination provided by the GTD, where at least one individual must
be killed in an attack, the following hypothesis is proposed: Attacks that produce greater harm,
in terms of fatalities and injuries, are more likely to result in a successful assassination than
those that cause fewer fatalities and injuries (H15).
As noted, an assassination is only successful if the intended target is killed. Thus, if
several bystanders are killed but the target survives, the assassination is unsuccessful. Since the
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goal of an assassination is to murder a specific individual (or a few specified individuals) as
opposed to attacks that target general categories and large numbers of individuals, it is important
to examine the collateral damage that occurs during an assassination. Given the goal of an
assassination, perhaps terrorists only intend to kill the target and do not aim to murder additional
individuals. On the other hand, it could be that more collateral deaths occur during successful
assassinations because terrorists seek to eliminate potential guardians that may come between
them and their target. Similarly, the terrorists may employ added firepower and purposefully
seek to kill everybody in the immediate vicinity to insure that they claim their intended target. It
is therefore hypothesized that Attacks that produce more collateral deaths (deaths other than the
intended target/s and the terrorists) are more likely to result in a successful assassination
compared to attacks that produce fewer collateral deaths (H16).

Distance
Some researchers explore the relationship between distance and attack success. For
example, Klein et al. (2016) find that as far-rightists live closer in proximity to their target’s
location, successful incidents are more likely. Other studies note that terrorists behave rationally
in choosing targets that are within an adequate distance from their cells (Rossmo & Harries,
2011). In their analysis of American terrorists, Cothren, Smith, and Roberts (2008) find that
roughly half reside and plan for their attacks within 30 miles of their place of residence. LaFree,
Yang, and Crenshaw (2009) also highlight how important proximity is for terrorists when they
choose their targets. In fact, Clarke and Newman (2006) maintain that target proximity is the
most important element of EVIL DONE. Meloy and Amman (2016) also explore the role of
distance in attacks on public figures in the U.S. They find that most of these attacks are direct
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and interpersonal (i.e., shootings, stabbings, etc.), while indirect attacks taking place at a greater
distance (i.e., IED attacks) occur less often. Inspired by these findings, it is hypothesized that:
Attacks where terrorists in close proximity (i.e., point-blank range) to their targets are more
likely to be successful than attacks where they are not in close proximity (H17).

Control Variables
In addition to these 17 hypotheses, 6 control variables are incorporated into this
dissertation’s analyses. Similar to research on crime concentration and day of the week, research
explores the relationship between terrorism events and the day of the week that they take place
(Parkin & Freilich, 2015). Fahey, LaFree, Dugan, and Piquero (2012) hypothesize that since
recreation travel is heaviest during summer months, attacks that occur during the summer will
generate more publicity than attacks that occur during other seasons. Fahey et al. (2012) also
hypothesize that because capital cities symbolically represent their nations, hijacked flights
leaving capital cities will generate more publicity and thus be related to terrorism. They find that
flights originating from a capital city are two and a half times more likely to be hijacked for
terrorist than non-terrorist purposes. Considering this literature and how terrorists seek publicity
(Clarke & Newman, 2006), the following control variables are incorporated: day of the week,
season2 and capital city. These variables are also related to the SCP technique of reducing
rewards. Two other control variables examine whether multiple terrorists were present during an
attack and time of day (see Shane & Magnuson, 2014). The final control variable is the year of
attack.

2

This study does not account for regional differences regarding season. Thus, “summer” represents the months
traditionally thought of as summer in the Northern Hemisphere: June, July, and August, even though these months
are considered winter for countries in the Southern Hemisphere.
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CH. 4: DATA

Data Background
As noted, criminology has been slow to embrace the study of terrorism. This is partly due
to challenges regarding defining and measuring terrorism. Scholars have noted how the study of
terrorism has historically neglected empirical data and statistical analyses (LaFree et al., 2015). It
is particularly challenging to measure terrorism since traditional data collection methods like
victimization surveys, self-report data, and official data can be difficult to acquire and each
possesses unique limitations and biases (Freilich & LaFree, 2016; LaFree et al., 2015). Scholars
also note the difficulty and impracticality of gaining data through interviewing terrorism suspects
and victims, especially given the rarity of such events (Freilich & LaFree, 2016). Considering the
fact that assassinations are rarer than other types of terrorist attacks, these same data challenges
are magnified for criminologists seeking to study assassinations. In response to these data
challenges, researchers rely on open-source terrorism event databases like the Global Terrorism
Database (GTD) (LaFree et al., 2015). Open source event databases have enabled researchers to
increasingly apply theories of criminology, like environmental criminology and SCP, to the
study of terrorism (Freilich, Adamczyk, Chermak, Boyd, & Parkin, 2015; LaFree & Bersani,
2014).
The GTD is maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. The GTD is a freely available
terrorism resource and is updated every year, recording information for every known
international and domestic terrorist attack since 1970 (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree et al.,
2015). According to LaFree et al. (2015), the GTD is the most extensive unclassified data source
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on terrorism currently in existence and unlike most other databases, also includes domestic
attacks. Data for the GTD are obtained from open source media outlets, and the dataset contains
close to 120 variables with information regarding the location of an attack, the weapons used in
an attack, the target types, the name of the terrorist group responsible, and the total number of
fatalities and injuries resulting from an attack (LaFree & Dugan, 2007). It also codes for different
attack types (like assassination, hijacking, kidnapping, etc.). This allows researchers to filter the
database to focus on specific types of attacks, like assassinations. When filtered to include only
assassination attacks, the GTD contains almost 17,000 incidents since 1970. Once an incident is
determined to align with the GTD’s terrorism definition, it must next satisfy its assassination
definition to be coded as such. The GTD’s assassination definition requires that the target be a
specific individual, as opposed to broad categories of people (i.e., Americans). If the goal of an
attack is to murder a prominent politician, but the strike fails to kill the named individual (even if
others are killed) it is coded as an unsuccessful assassination. The same holds true if the intended
target is injured but not killed.
Given the number of different variables and assassination events included in the GTD,
the dataset appears promising for assassination research. However, the dataset does contain some
limitations. Since the data is obtained from publicly available media sources, it is biased towards
those incidents of terrorism that are reported. Thus, attacks that occur in parts of the world with
less media attention (such as North Korea) are less likely to be included (LaFree & Dugan,
2007). However, it can be argued that since assassinations often target prominent and wellknown individuals, they are more likely to gain media attention and thus be included in the GTD.
The GTD has received criticism for defining successful terrorist attacks too broadly. It is worth
noting though, that of all the tactics coded in the GTD, assassination is one of the most
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conservatively coded tactics in terms of success. The definition requires that a specific individual
must die for the attack to be classified as successful.
One potential issue is that the GTD not only codes for the primary (i.e., main) attack type,
but also for secondary and tertiary attack types. This means that an assassination can be paired
with other attack types such as bombings or kidnappings. However, a preliminary analysis of the
data reveals that out of almost 17,000 assassinations between 1970 and 2014, only 169 are
considered secondary attack types, while only 4 are coded as tertiary attacks. Since the definition
of a successful attack in the GTD is tied to the primary attack type, including secondary and
tertiary assassinations in the final sampling pool means that if any such cases are selected in the
random sample, then they would need to be recoded depending on whether or not the
assassination was successful rather than referring to the success of the primary attack type (like
bombings, firearms, kidnappings). To include as many assassination events in the final sample,
all assassinations are included in the sampling pool (primary, secondary and tertiary
assassinations). Thus, for any selected incidents that have a different primary attack type (like a
bombing or kidnapping) but an assassination as the secondary or tertiary attack type, the
“success” variable for those incidents may be recoded. For example, if an incident has a primary
attack type as a bombing which was successful but the secondary attack type of the assassination
was unsuccessful, the “success” variable should be recoded as unsuccessful.
Although the GTD does contain some limitations, it offers a promising starting point for
researchers to examine terrorist assassinations. Since the GTD lacks more detailed information
regarding assassination events, this dissertation expands upon the dataset by going back to the
open source material and adding variables to fit the framework of environmental criminology
and SCP. Specifically, materials from LexisNexis and Google are examined to code for SCP
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specific variables not contained in the GTD. A random sample of 1,000 successful and 1,000
unsuccessful assassinations from 2005-2014 was first obtained from the GTD. After this random
sample was selected, the coding of the new variables for each incident commenced. The
following section summarizes the new variables constructed from the SCP literature discussed
above.

Dependent Variable, Independent Variables & Control Variables
This dissertation’s dependent variable in the final analysis is the dichotomous variable for
assassination “success”, where a value of 0 indicates the attack was not successful (i.e., the
intended target was not killed), and a value of 1 indicates that the assassination was successful
(i.e., the target was killed). The use of open source materials from LexisNexis and Google to
code for key SCP specific variables not contained in the GTD allows for the framework to be
better tested compared to if only GTD variables are used. As illustrated below, if this dissertation
were limited to using GTD data alone, only 5 out of the 17 hypotheses would be tested.
Therefore, a strength of this study is its use of open sources to create new independent variables
allowing for the testing of an additional 12 hypotheses.
As seen in Table 2, a total of 10 key predictor independent variables are included in the
analysis, of which 3 are from the GTD, 1 is derived from both the GTD and open sources, and 6
are entirely new variables. The new independent variables include the following: whether
security was present and responded during the attack (H1 and H2) (0 = no security guards
present, 1 = security guards present but no response, 2 = security guards present and responded),
others around (H3) (0 = no one other than target/terrorists present, 1 = only family present, 2 =
only bystanders present, 3 = bystanders and family present), weapon type (H4-H6) (0 =
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explosives (not sticky bomb or suicide), 1 = firearms, 2 = sticky bombs, 3 = suicide bombs, 4 =
more than one weapon type used, 5 = other weapon type), target location (H8-H11) (0 = target
outside, 1 = target in motor vehicle, 2 = target on motorcycle, 3 = target inside building or
structure that is not work/home, 4 = target at work, 5 = target at home, 6 = target at other
location), target motorcade (H12) (0 = no motorcade, 1 = motorcade), terrorist location (H13H14) (0 = terrorists attacked while outside a physical building or structure, 1 = terrorists attacked
from a motor vehicle, 2 = terrorists attacked from a motorcycle, 3 = terrorists attacked while
inside a building/structure, 4 = terrorists attacked from elsewhere and were the terrorists in close
proximity (i.e., point-blank range) to the target when they attacked (H17) (0 = no, 1 = yes)? A
pretest was conducted on 200 assassination cases, and results indicate support for incorporating
these variables (Mandala & Freilich, 2017a). In addition to the new SCP variables created from
the open-source materials, 3 independent variables originating in the GTD will also be used.
These include the following: target type (H7) (0 = government (diplomatic and general), 1 =
journalists, 2 = military, 3 = police, 4 = private citizens, 5 = religious figures, 6 = terrorists and
non-state militia, 7 = violent political parties, 8 = all others), victims struck (total fatalities and
injuries) (H15), and total collateral deaths (other than terrorists and target) (H16).
A total of 6 control variables are incorporated into the analysis, of which 4 are from the
GTD and 2 are new variables created from the open source materials. Control variables
originating from the GTD (or coded from information contained in the GTD) include the
following: year of attack, season, day of week and whether multiple terrorists were present (0 =
no, 1 = yes). A total of 2 control variables were created from the open source materials: time of
day and whether the attack occurred in a capital city (0 = no, 1 = yes). These control variables
were included based off of the prior SCP literature. For example, Shane and Magnuson (2014)

44

and Shane et al. (2015) utilize many of these control variables in their studies on SCP and
maritime piracy. In addition, Parkin and Freilich (2015) use similar control variables in their
routine activities theory analysis of ideological and non-ideological attacks by far-right
extremists in the United States.
Since this dissertation tests a large number of hypotheses and thus independent variables,
a few variables were ultimately dropped or collapsed for containing too many missing values.
Thus, as explained in the following sections, the final number of hypotheses and variables tested
slightly differ from what is discussed above. To help tease out the full effect of all the variables,
the first regression model contains only the predictor variables and no control variables. Next, a
second model contains the control variables and the significant predictor variables. A third model
contains all independent and control variables, regardless of their significance in the prior
models. Finally, models containing all independent and control variables are run for each region
to determine any potential regional differences.

Table 2: Hypotheses and Corresponding Variables
Category

Capable Guardians
(official security)

Hypothesis
1. Attacks where security guards are present are less likely to result
in a successful assassination compared to attacks where no security
guards are present.
2. Attacks where security guards are present and respond are less
likely to result in a successful assassination compared to attacks
where no security guards are present.

Variable
Security Presence: 0 = no
security guards present; 1 =
security guards present but no
response; 2 = security guards
present and respond

Capable Guardians
(not security)

3. Attacks where others are present at the scene of the incident (i.e.,
individuals other than the terrorists and target) are less likely to be
successful compared to attacks where other individuals are not
present.

Others Around: 0 = no one
other than
target/terrorists/security
present; 1 = only family
present; 2 = only bystanders
present; 3 = bystanders and
family present.

Weapons

4. Attacks where suicide bombs are used, as opposed to other types
of explosives, are more likely to result in a successful assassination.
5. Attacks where firearms are used, as opposed to explosives, are
more likely to result in a successful assassination.
6. Attacks where magnetic "sticky" bombs are used compared to
other types of explosives are less likely to result in a successful
assassination.

Weapon Type: 0 = explosives
(not sticky bomb or suicide); 1
= firearms; 2 = sticky bombs; 3
= suicide bombs; 4 = more than
one weapon type used; 5 =
other weapon type
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Targets (type)

7. Attacks that focus on unofficial targets (i.e., targets not affiliated
with the government, like tourists, civilians, and journalists), thought
to be less secure and more destructible, are more likely to result in a
successful assassination compared to official targets (like police,
diplomats and military officials).

8. Attacks that occur inside a building or structure are less likely to be
successful than attacks that occur outside of physical buildings or
structures.

Targets (location)

9. Attacks that occur at the target's place of work are less likely to be
successful than those that occur outside of physical buildings or
structures.
10. Attacks that occur at the target's home are less likely to be
successful than those that occur outside of physical buildings/ or
structures.
11. Attacks that occur while the target is in a motor vehicle or
motorcycle are less likely to be successful than assassinations where
the target is outside of a physical building or structure.

Target Type: 0 = government
(diplomatic and general) 1 =
journalists; 2 = military; 3 =
police; 4 = private citizens; 5 =
religious figures; 6 = terrorists
and non-state militia; 7 = violent
political parties; 8 = other
(airports, business, education,
NGO, transportation)

Target Location: 0 = target
outside; 1 = target in motor
vehicle; 2 = target on
motorcycle; 3 = target inside
building or structure that is not
work/home; 4 = target at work;
5 = target at home

Targets
(protection)

12. Attacks that occur while the target is traveling in a motorcade are
less likely to be successful than assassinations where there is no
motorcade involved

Target Motorcade: 0 = no
motorcade; 1 = motorcade

Terrorists
(location)

13. Incidents where terrorists attack from inside a motor vehicle, or
while riding a motorcycle, are more likely to result in a successful
assassination compared to incidents where terrorists attack from
outside (i.e., outside a building or structure, not in a motor vehicle).
14. Incidents where terrorists attack from inside a building or
structure are less likely to result in a successful assassination
compared to incidents where terrorists attack from outside a building
or structure.

Terrorists Location: 0 =
terrorists attack while outside a
physical building or structure; 1
= terrorists attack from a motor
vehicle; 2 = terrorists attack
from a motorcycle; 3 = terrorists
attack while inside a
building/structure

15. Attacks that produce greater harm, in terms of fatalities and
injuries, are more likely to result in a successful assassination than
those that cause fewer fatalities and injuries.

Victims struck (total deaths and
injuries)

16. Attacks that produce more collateral deaths (deaths other than
the intended target/s and the terrorists) are more likely to result in a
successful assassination compared to attacks that produce fewer
collateral deaths.

Collateral: Number of collateral
deaths (deaths other than
target/terrorists)

17. Attacks where terrorists are located in close proximity (i.e., pointblank range) to their targets are more likely to be successful than
attacks where they are not in close proximity.

Target Proximity: 0 = terrorists
not in close proximity to target;
1 = terrorists are in close
proximity to target

Attack Intensity

Distance

CH. 5: METHODOLOGY

Research Design
This dissertation utilizes a random sample from the GTD of 1,000 successful and 1,000
unsuccessful terrorist assassination incidents occurring between 2005 and 2014. As the study by
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Mandala and Freilich (2017a) demonstrates, the time period of 2005-2014 was selected because
more open source materials are available for these years compared to prior years. The time
period ends in 2014, rather than a more recent year, to account for the possibility of more
information becoming available or being released for some incidents after 2014. Lastly, the time
period begins in 2005, after 9/11 and the start of the Iraq war, to control for the geopolitical
realities that did not exist prior to 2005. Once the sample (n = 2,000) was obtained, open source
materials from LexisNexis and Google were consulted for every incident. This enabled the
creation of additional SCP specific variables, and thus the theoretical framework could be fully
tested in the final analyses. The GTD cites up to 3 news sources per incident, sometimes even
containing the original URL. These news sources cited in the GTD were first searched using
LexisNexis and Google. If they could not be found, then additional sources were sought using
these search engines. The search criteria for each attack included key terms related to the
incident, such as the city or the name of the target or terrorist group involved. The GTD also
contains a narrative variable for every incident, usually summarizing what occurred during the
attack in a few sentences. In the event that no news sources could be found for an incident, then
the narrative for that case was consulted to code for the new variables.
This dissertation’s process of searching for and selecting the media reports for the
assassinations it analyzed largely mirrored the methodology outlined in the GTD Codebook
(National Consortium, 2016). As noted in the GTD Codebook, there is considerable variability
regarding the availability and quality of open source materials. In fact, the quality and quantity of
information often varies based on the time and geographic location of the attack (National
Consortium, 2016). As a result of this variation in the quality of the open source documents, the
GTD coding team developed a methodology for assessing the quality of sources that was

47

similarly followed in this study. Information provided by high-quality sources was prioritized
over information from less reliable sources. As discussed in the GTD Codebook, sources are
classified as high quality if they are independent (i.e., not influenced by the government or other
entities) and continually report verifiable information, as well as those that are primary instead of
secondary sources. In fact, an incident can only be included in the GTD if it has been
documented by at least one source deemed to be high quality. Those incidents that are reported
by biased sources are therefore excluded from the GTD, although the Codebook notes that some
information from these sources may be used, such as information related to the attack motive.
With regards to the search engines utilized for obtaining the media reports, Google was
primarily used when the original sources cited by the GTD could not be located in LexisNexis,
or when no reports on a particular incident could be found in LexisNexis. Thus, Google was used
less often than LexisNexis. LexisNexis is particularly relevant for obtaining the open sources for
this study, as it includes reports from media outlets originating in hundreds of countries around
the world. It thus provides a large number of high quality, as well as low quality, sources.
Importantly, LexisNexis is suitable for this study because it automatically provides Englishlanguage translations for articles originating in other languages. Sources were therefore not
limited to those outlets that were large or national in scale, as sources from smaller-scale media
outlets were also provided. Examples of some of this study’s media sources include: the New
York Times, Agence-France Presse, Xinhua General News Service, BBC News, Reuters, the
Associated Press, United News of Bangladesh, the Guardian, the Business Recorder, the Daily
Trust, the Afghan Islamic Press, the Hindustan Times, and the Daily Times. Several other
examples of the sources consulted can be found in the GTD dataset itself (see the scite1, scite2,
and scite3 variables) (National Consortium, 2015).
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In addition to following the methodology outlined by the GTD to prioritize high over low
quality sources, several steps were taken during the coding of the new SCP variables to ensure
the quality of the data. For example, information already coded in the GTD for a particular
incident was cross-referenced with any new source that was used to code for the SCP variables.
Thus, if the GTD had coded the target type for a particular case as a police officer, then the new
source was reviewed to make sure it provided consistent information. It is also important to note
that while only one individual coded all of the new variables used in this study, steps were taken
to ensure data quality. After the open source materials were initially reviewed for each case and
the new variables were coded, brief summaries of each incident were created. After coding was
completed for all the incidents, the open source materials were again reviewed for each case to
make sure they were coded correctly. Thus, each case was coded twice using the full media
reports that were acquired. After this second phase of coding was completed, the entire dataset
was cross-referenced with the case summaries to further check for any coding errors.
This study’s approach of incorporating new SCP variables is inspired by recent studies
examining maritime piracy and SCP. In particular, scholars have examined piracy attack
narratives published by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and coded for SCP variables to
test the influence of these variables on piracy attacks. As seen in the studies by Shane and
Magnuson (2014) and Shane et al. (2015), this approach offers an effective and informative
avenue to fully test the SCP framework. Mandala and Freilich (2017a) successfully utilize this
approach in their analysis of 200 assassination cases. This dissertation therefore applies a similar
strategy by reviewing news reports of 2,000 terrorist assassination incidents.
It can be argued that that since assassinations represent rare events, a matched casecontrol design may be well-suited for this study. Dobrin (2001) explains the main idea behind the
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case-control design is that certain factors that could be influencing the outcome are compared
between the case and control groups. In a matched case-control design, unsuccessful and
successful assassination events would be matched based on certain factors that could influence
the success of an event (such as weapon type used, target type, region or country, terrorist group
involved, target and terrorist location during attack, protection measures in place, etc.). The goal
is to obtain case and control groups (i.e., successful and unsuccessful assassinations) that are
identical on a range of characteristics except for the outcome of interest (attack success).
Goodman, Mercy, Layde, and Thacker (1988) discuss the strengths and limitations of the
case-control design to study homicide risk factors. The authors note that the case-control design
is especially useful for infrequent violent events like homicide. They note that the design is
subject to issues regarding selecting cases and suitable control groups, along with information
bias as well as issues regarding access to data. Dobrin (2001) uses a case-control design to
compare the criminality of homicide and non-homicide victims. Individuals in the case and
control groups were matched on demographic characteristics including race, gender and age. The
author notes that this approach is often used in epidemiology and public health, and is similarly
useful to study homicide (Dobrin, 2001).
The case-control design has been successfully applied to topics outside the realm of
traditional crime, including terrorism. For example, Smith (2004) matched 13 terrorist groups
with non-terrorist groups based on the groups’ values. From an analysis of these groups’
documents, the author determined that their expressed values can determine their likelihood of
participating in terrorism. Clarke and Rolf (2013) use a matched case-control design to examine
the poaching of neotropical parrots. They matched parrot species to similar birds based on
ecological factors and spatial range. The authors explain how this approach was limited by the
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available data. For example, they could not address possible differences in the diets of the two
groups, an important factor since diet is very much related to habitat. They also explain how they
had to use range as a proxy for habitat since it was not possible to compare the true habitats of
the groups with the available data.
Researchers have noted the utility of using the case-control design for rare events like
homicide (Goodman, 1988; Dobrin, 2001), and as Dobrin (2001) emphasizes, the approach is
especially beneficial when there is a small sample size with known outcomes being studied.
While terrorist assassinations represent relatively rare events, the number of total assassinations
occurring between 2005 and 2014 is quite large (around 6,500 events). Thus, for the purpose of
this study, there are no challenges in obtaining a large sample size of assassinations. Many of the
studies cited above, including Smith (2004), note that a challenge in implementing the casecontrol design is the selection of suitable control groups as well as limitations present in the data
available. Since the assassination cases examined in this study are all derived from open sources
that all vary with regards to the detail of information contained for each event, the application of
a case-control design can be potentially problematic. By contrast, the use of a random selection
of assassination cases avoids the challenges of selecting a suitable control group and the
possibility of excluding important variables in the selection process. In addition, it allows for the
use of a larger sample size compared to a case-control design since cases do not need to be
evaluated and matched on all the selected criteria. Lastly, case-control design would be more
time intensive than a random sample, as the open sources and the data would first need to be
consulted to determine the appropriate criteria for matching the case and control groups.
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Univariate & Bivariate Statistics
As seen in Table 1, this dissertation utilizes 10 key predictor independent variables and 6
additional control variables, with one dependent variable (successful v. unsuccessful
assassinations). To start, descriptive statistics in the form of frequencies and measures of central
tendency are conducted for every variable. While most of the variables are dichotomous and
categorical, measures of central tendency are generated for the continuous variables (total
fatalities, total injuries, and collateral deaths). These preliminary analyses will detect if any of
the variables contain a large number of missing cases. After the descriptive statistics are
conducted for each variable, bivariate analyses are then run between the dependent variable
(success) and the independent variables.
Independent samples t-tests are run on the dependent variable and the continuous
independent variables (victims struck and collateral deaths). Chi square tests for association with
the Cramer’s V coefficient are run between the dependent variable and all categorical variables
containing more than 2 categories, including: security presence, terrorist location, target location,
were others around during the attack, target type, weapon type, day of the week, season and time
of day. Lastly, chi square tests for association and the Phi coefficient are conducted between the
dependent variable and all dichotomous variables, which assist in determining the relationship
between any two variables. These variables include: capital, multiple terrorists, target proximity,
and target motorcade. In the event that any variables are highly related, then one variable may
need to be eliminated from the multivariate analysis since the two variables are essentially
measuring the same concept. If some variables appear to be measuring the same construct and
are highly related, another option is to create an index. This can be done through a principal
component analysis (PCA), where the resulting principal component is used in the regression
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model to represent the construct. The bivariate analyses ultimately help tease out the potential
relationships that exist between the dependent and independent variables, and thus help inform
the development of the final multivariate model.

Multivariate Analysis
The final multivariate analysis uses a binary logistic regression to test the influence of the
independent variables on successful assassination incidents. Since the dependent variable
indicating whether or not an assassination was successful is dichotomous (i.e., it has 2 levels,
where 0 is coded for unsuccessful attacks and 1 is coded for successful attacks), a binary logistic
regression is appropriate, as opposed to an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression where the
dependent variable must be continuously measured (Menard, 2011; Maroof, 2012). The goal of
the binary logistic regression is to determine the likelihood or odds of belonging to one of the
dependent variable categories based on the independent variables included in the model (Maroof,
2012). While there is no order to the dependent variable, the reference group is usually chosen to
best assist the interpretation of the resulting coefficients (Maroof, 2012). In a binary logistic
regression, the independent or predictor variables can be continuous and/or discrete (Maroof,
2012). As Legault and Hendrickson (2009) point out, the use of a logistic regression allows for a
more complete interpretation of the impact of the predictor variables on the dependent variable
while holding all other variables constant. This means that for the purposes of this dissertation,
the odds of an assassination being successful based on each SCP explanatory variable can be
determined (Legault & Hendrickson, 2009).
Scholars note that the use of a binary logistic regression is advantageous because the
resulting coefficients are relatively easy to interpret (Legault & Hendrickson, 2009). In
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particular, the odds ratio specifies the odds of belonging to one of the dependent variable
categories for every one-unit change in an independent (predictor) variable, while also
controlling for all other variables (Maroof, 2012). In addition, when the regression coefficients
are exponentiated and transformed (by subtracting 1 from the odds ratio and then multiplying the
result by 100), the result can be more easily understood in terms of a “percent change in odds of
the dependent variable for a one-unit change in the independent variable” (Legault &
Hendrickson, 2009, p. 541). Another advantage is that compared to a linear regression, a logistic
regression does not require the assumptions of linearity, normality or homoscedasticity to be met
(Maroof, 2012). The assumption of linearity required by an OLS regression is thus avoided in the
logistic regression by the equation being expressed in logarithmic terms (Maroof, 2012).
Several criminology studies use a binary logistic regression to test SCP. Shane and
Magnuson (2014) test the influence of SCP on successful maritime piracy attacks through the use
of a binary logistic regression. Binary logistic regressions have also been used to effectively test
the association between SCP and terrorism. In particular, Legault and Hendrickson (2009) use a
binary logistic regression to study firearm offenses by felons and terrorists, ultimately finding
that terrorists are more likely than felons to be convicted of firearm offenses. Fahey et al. (2015)
apply a binary logistic regression to examine whether SCP factors can distinguish terrorist from
non-terrorist areal hijackings. Another study utilizes a binary logistic regression to determine the
impact of opportunity on far-right terrorist outcomes in the U.S. (Klein et al., 2016). Block
(2016) uses a binary logistic regression to study the impact of SCP on terror attacks against
airports and aircrafts. Mandala and Freilich (2017a) utilize a binary logistic regression to test the
effect of SCP on successful assassination incidents. As illustrated by each of these studies, binary
logistic regression is useful to analyze the influence of SCP elements on terrorist event
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outcomes. The results of the binary logistic regression for this dissertation will therefore help
reveal which SCP variables have an influence on successful assassination incidents.
As noted, one model is run containing only predictor variables and no control variables,
and another model contains all significant predictor variables and control variables. A third
model includes all variables, regardless of significance in the prior models. This approach allows
for the full model to be compared and contrasted to the partial models. This assists with the
interpretation of the results as the findings may differ when control variables are or are not
accounted for.
To explore the cultural context behind these assassinations in more detail, additional
models are run for different regions to assess whether there are any regional differences in the
impact of SCP on assassination outcomes. For example, perhaps certain environmental factors in
the Middle East enable successful assassinations; while the presence of those factors in South
Asia instead contribute to unsuccessful assassinations. Exploring the cultural context behind
assassinations in this manner follows the strategy implemented by Shane et al. (2015), who
examine whether the impact of SCP on successful maritime piracy attacks are consistent across
different continents. Terrorist assassinations may similarly differ at the regional level. While
Shane et al. (2015) find that the disaggregated SCP techniques are effective in each continent,
when these techniques are aggregated to indices to measure the concepts of “increased risk” and
“increased effort”, continent-level differences are apparent for the techniques classified under the
“increased risk” component. Specifically, “increased risk” is associated with more unsuccessful
piracy attacks in 3 out of the 6 continents studied, but associated with fewer unsuccessful attacks
in the remaining 3 continents.
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CH. 6: RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 displays the frequency counts for all of the variables. As noted in this table,
missing values are not a problem for the majority of the variables. The Time of Day variable has
a substantial number of missing values (57%), and as a result, cannot be used in the multivariate
models. Table 3 shows that all other variables have less than 30% missing values, which
indicates that they can be used in the final models. For some of the region models, missing
values did become an issue due to the smaller sample sizes. As detailed in the Multivariate
Analyses section below, a few variables therefore had to be either dropped or collapsed for these
models.
Table 3 shows that the sample size is 2,056, with 1,027 successful assassinations and
1,029 unsuccessful assassinations. While the goal was to select a sample size of exactly 2,000
cases, the random sample method utilized in SPSS returned a slightly larger sample. Initially, a
sample of 2,000 cases was coded from this SPSS selection. However, as coding of the cases
progressed, it was discovered that some cases were incorrectly coded in the GTD as either
successful or unsuccessful. When such cases were discovered, they were re-coded to reflect the
correct classification. The coding errors in the “Success” variable therefore slightly skewed the
sample so that there was no longer an even number of successful and unsuccessful
assassinations. To insure a relatively even number of successful and unsuccessful events, as well
as to account for the possibility of missing cases reducing the sample size in the multivariate
models, some of the extra cases returned by the initial SPSS sample were incorporated. As a
result, the final sample size slightly exceeds 2,000.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, 2005-2014

Successful
Unsuccessful
No Security Present
Security Present, No Response
Security Present and Responded
Others Around
Others Not Present
Only Family of Target Present
Only Bystanders Present
Family and Bystanders Present
Weapon Type
Explosives
Firearms
Sticky Bombs
Suicide Bombs
Multiple Weapons
Other/Unknown Weapons
Target Type
Government (diplomatic/general)
Journalists
Military
Police
Private Citizens
Religious Figures
Terrorists/Non-state Militia
Violent Political Party
Other
Target Location*
Outside
In Motor Vehicle
On Motorcycle
Inside Building or Structure
At Work
At Home
In Motorcade
Terrorist Location*
Outside Building/Structure

Total
1027
1029
1292
551
213

Percent
50%
50%
63%
27%
10%

1131
171
697
55

55%
8%
34%
3%

525
1195
81
96
73
86

26%
58%
4%
5%
4%
4%

931
80
165
325
286
61
99
65
44

45%
4%
8%
16%
14%
3%
5%
3%
2%

307
921
35
53
39
154
337

15%
45%
2%
3%
2%
8%
16%

1018

50%
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In Motor Vehicle
On Motorcycle
Inside Building or Structure
Total Victims Struck
Total Collateral Deaths
Terrorists Attacked in Close
Proximity to Target
Day of Week
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Sunday
Season
Fall (Sept. – Nov.)
Winter (Dec. – Feb.)
Spring (March – May)
Summer (June – Aug.)
Time of Day*
12:00 am – 05:59 am
06:00 am – 11:59 am
12:00 pm – 05:59 pm
06:00 – 11:59 pm
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
In Capital City
Multiple Terrorists Present
Region
Central America & Caribbean
Central Asia
Eastern Europe
Middle East & North Africa
North America
South America
South Asia

289
227
168
5552
2305

14%
11%
8%

427

21%

329
320
301
280
266
253
307

16%
16%
15%
14%
13%
12%
15%

491
450
578
537

24%
22%
28%
26%

67
270
160
385

3%
13%
8%
19%

115
71
83
126
119
194
212
231
456
449
335
1362

6%
4%
4%
6%
6%
9%
10%
11%
22%
22%
16%
66%

6
5
62
856
4
20
695

0.3%
0.2%
3%
42%
0.2%
1%
34%
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Southeast Asia
210
10%
Sub-Saharan Africa
191
9%
Western Europe
7
0.3%
*57% missing values for time of day; Missing values for target
location 27%; Missing values for terrorist location 17%
**Note: Official targets include government and diplomatic officials,
police, and military.

Table 3 shows that in most cases, security was not present during the attack (63%), while about a
third of cases had security present that did not engage the terrorists. A smaller portion of
assassinations (10%) had security present that did engage the terrorists during the attack. In
about half of all assassinations, there were no others present at the scene other than the target,
terrorists, and security team. In about a third of cases, bystanders were present, while family
members of the target were present in only 8% of cases.
In the majority of assassinations (58%), the terrorists used firearms as their primary
weapon. In about a third of attacks, terrorists used explosives as their main weapon type. Sticky
bombs were only used in 4% of attacks, while suicide attacks occurred in 5% of events.
Interestingly, a very small percentage of incidents employed multiple weapon types (4%).
With regards to target characteristics, almost half of all assassination targets were
government officials (45%). The next most frequent target type was police (16%), followed by
private citizens (14%). Roughly half of all attacks took place when the target was inside a motor
vehicle (45%), and 15% occurred while the target was outside a physical building or structure. In
13% of assassination incidents, the target was inside a building or structure, at work, or at their
residence. A large number of targets travelling in motor vehicles also were travelling as part of a
motorcade (16%).
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In half of all cases, terrorists attacked from outside a physical building or structure,
compared to attacking from inside a building in only 8% of events. In roughly a third of
assassinations, the terrorists attacked from either a motor vehicle (14%) or motorcycle (11%). In
almost a quarter of attacks (21%), the terrorists were able to attack their target at a close
proximity (i.e., within point-blank range).
In the selected sample, a total of 5,552 victims were struck (i.e., either killed or injured)
in assassination attacks between 2005-2014. A total of 2,305 collateral deaths (i.e., deaths other
than the intended target/s and terrorists) also occurred within the sample during this time period.
There was generally an even distribution of assassinations across the different days of the
week. The smallest proportion of assassinations occurred on a Saturday (12%), while the largest
percentage occurred on either a Monday (16%) or Tuesday (16%). Similarly, assassinations
appear to be evenly distributed across seasons. The highest proportion of attacks occurred during
the spring (28%), while the smallest percentage occurred during the winter (22%). While most
cases did not contain information regarding the time of day that attacks took place, roughly 20%
of assassinations occurred at night (between 6 pm and midnight), while 13% occurred in the
morning (between 6 am and noon). Table 3 also shows the total number of attacks that occurred
by year. Specifically, the highest proportion of assassinations occurred in 2013 (22%) and 2014
(22%), while 2006 and 2007 experienced the smallest percentage of attacks (at 4% each). In 16%
of cases, the attacks occurred within a capital city. In most assassinations (66%), multiple
terrorists were present at the scene of the attack. With regards to region, the largest percentage of
assassinations occurred in the Middle East and North Africa (42%), followed by South Asia
(34%), Southeast Asia (10%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (9%).
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Bivariate Statistics
Tables 4 - 8 display the results from the bivariate tests conducted between the dependent
variable (Success) and the various independent and control variables. Specifically, these
bivariate tests include independent samples t-tests and cross-tabulations with chi square tests.
The goal of these bivariate tests is to inform the multivariate models, as results from these tests
can indicate whether any independent variables are significantly associated with the dependent
variable.
Table 4 shows the results of the t-test run for attack success and collateral deaths. This
test shows a significant relationship between the two variables t(2054) = -12.21, p < .001. On
average, successful assassinations experienced a higher number of collateral deaths (M = 1.65,
SD = 2) compared to unsuccessful assassinations (M = 0.60, SD = 1.9). These results are
supportive of H16, which predicts that attacks that produce more collateral deaths are more
likely to result in a successful assassination compared to attacks that produce fewer collateral
deaths.

Table 5 displays the chi square results conducted between the dependent variable and the
following variables: multiple terrorists, target in motorcade, close proximity, security present,
and official target. A statistically significant difference exists between successful assassinations
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and whether or not multiple terrorists were present at the attack scene, with a moderate effect
size. The majority of incidents involving multiple terrorists were successful (62%), while most
incidents that did not involve multiple terrorists were unsuccessful (73%). A moderate and
significant relationship similarly exists between the motorcade variable and the dependent
variable. The majority of cases where the target was in a motorcade were unsuccessful (87%),
and most cases where the target was not in a motorcade were successful (57%). This result is
supportive of H12, which predicts that attacks that occur while the target is travelling in a
motorcade are less likely to be successful than assassinations where there is no motorcade
involved.

Table 5 shows that a weak and significant relationship exists between the proximity
variable and the dependent variable. In support of H17, most events where the terrorists were in
close proximity to the target resulted in a successful assassination (74%), while most cases where
the terrorists were not in close proximity to the target were unsuccessful (56%). A moderate and
significant association was found between attack success and the security present variable. In
support of H1 and H2, the majority of cases where security engaged the terrorists were
unsuccessful (84%), and most cases where security was present but did not respond were also
successful (68%). The majority of cases where security was not present were successful (63%).
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A significant but weak relationship was found between success and whether or not the target was
a government official. Interestingly, the majority of attacks where the target was a government
official were unsuccessful (74%), and most attacks where the target was not a government
official were successful (54%). This finding supports H7, which posits that unofficial targets are
more susceptible to successful assassinations due to lacking the security that official government
targets tend to have in place.
The chi-square results between the dependent variable and the target location and terrorist
location variables are displayed in Table 6. A moderately significant relationship exists between
attack success and the target location variable. Most cases that occurred when the target was
outside were successful (81%), and most cases that occurred when the target was in a motor
vehicle were unsuccessful (64%). These findings are supportive of H11, which predicts that
attacks that occur while the target is in a motor vehicle are less likely to be successful than
assassinations where the target is outside. However, contrary to H11, which also predicts that
targets riding motorcycles are less likely to be involved in successful assassinations compared to
when they are outside, the majority of incidents where the target was riding a motorcycle were
successful (89%). Most attacks where the target was inside, at work, or at home were successful
(66%, 56%, and 54%, respectively). These results appear to contrast H8, H9, and H10. These
hypotheses posit that attacks that occur when the target is inside, at work, or at home are less
likely to be successful than attacks that occur outside. A weak and significant association was
found between the terrorist location variable and the dependent variable. In particular, most cases
where the terrorists were outside or in a motor vehicle were unsuccessful (63% and 59%,
respectively). The majority of incidents where the terrorists were on a motorcycle (69%) or
inside (69%) were successful. Interestingly, this result contrasts what was predicted by H13. H13
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predicts that attacks where terrorists attack from a motor vehicle or motorcycle are more likely to
be successful compared to incidents where terrorists attack form outside a building or structure.
However, the results appear to support H14, which posits that attacks where terrorists attack
from inside a building or structure are more likely to be successful compared to events where
terrorists attack from outside.

Table 7 shows that there is a strong and statistically significant relationship between
weapon type and attack success. In support of H5, the majority of incidents where explosives
were used were unsuccessful (84%), while the majority of incidents where firearms were used
were successful (68%). In support of H6, sticky bombs (65%) and suicide attacks (65%) were
associated with unsuccessful attacks. Interestingly, attacks where multiple weapons were utilized
were associated with unsuccessful attacks (69%). A weak and statistically significant association
was found between the others around variable and attack success. When no one other than the
terrorists, target, and security members were present, attacks were more likely to be successful
(59%). Similarly, when only family members of the target were present during the attack, the
assassination attempt was more likely to be successful (57%). When bystanders were present
during an attack, the attack was more likely to be unsuccessful (65%). The majority of attacks
where both family members of the target and bystanders were present were unsuccessful (56%).
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These results are mostly supportive of H3, which predicts that attacks where others are present at
the scene of the incident are less likely to be successful compared to attacks where other
individuals are not present.

As seen in Table 8, a weak but statistically significant relationship exists between attack
success and day of the week. Most cases that took place on a Sunday, Tuesday, Thursday, and
Friday were successful (52%, 53%, 53%, and 56%, respectively). By contrast, most cases that
occurred on a Monday or Wednesday were unsuccessful (58% and 53%), while an even number
of attacks that took place on Saturday were successful and unsuccessful.

Several bivariate tests that were conducted were insignificant. Specifically, the
independent samples t-test that was run between attack success and total victims struck (i.e.,
fatalities and injuries) was insignificant. This result is interesting considering how the t-test
above found the variable for collateral deaths to be significantly associated with attack success.
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For the chi-square tests, insignificant results were found between attack success and the
following control variables: season, capital city, and time of day.

Multivariate Analyses
This dissertation employs a series of binary logistic regressions to determine the full
effects of the independent variables on successful assassination incidents. The dependent
variable is the dichotomous measure of attack success (1 = successful, 0 = unsuccessful). Again,
assassinations are considered successful only if the intended target is killed. A total of 7 binary
logistic models are conducted. The first model contains all explanatory variables and no control
variables. The second model contains all significant predictor variables from the first model
along with the control variables. The third model contains all independent and control variables.
The comparison of these first three models allows us to see how the model improves when
additional independent and control variables are incorporated. The last four regressions are
regional models for the following regions: the Middle East & North Africa, South Asia,
Southeast Asia, and Sub Saharan Africa. These models allow us to see if there are differences
regarding situational characteristics and successful assassinations by region.
A total of 10 independent variables are used in the multivariate models. The new SCP
variables include the following: whether security was present and responded during the attack (0
= no security guards present, 1 = security guards present but no response, 2 = security guards
present and responded), others around (0 = no one other than target/terrorists present, 1 = only
family present, 2 = only bystanders present, 3 = bystanders and family present), weapon type (0
= explosives (not sticky bomb or suicide), 1 = firearms, 2 = sticky bombs, 3 = suicide bombs, 4 =
more than one weapon type used, 5 = other weapon type), target location (0 = target outside, 1 =
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target in motor vehicle, 2 = target on motorcycle, 3 = target inside building or structure that is
not work/home, 4 = target at work, 5 = target at home, 6 = target at other location), target
motorcade (0 = no motorcade, 1 = motorcade), terrorist location (0 = terrorists attacked while
outside a physical building or structure, 1 = terrorists attacked from a motor vehicle, 2 =
terrorists attacked from a motorcycle, 3 = terrorists attacked while inside a building/structure, 4 =
terrorists attacked from elsewhere) and were the terrorists in close proximity (i.e., point-blank
range) to the target when they attacked (0 = no, 1 = yes)? The 3 variables originating from the
GTD include the following: target type (0 = government (diplomatic and general), 1 =
journalists, 2 = military, 3 = police, 4 = private citizens, 5 = religious figures, 6 = terrorists and
non-state militia, 7 = violent political parties, 8 = all others), victims struck (total fatalities and
injuries), and total collateral deaths (other than terrorists and target). However, it is worth noting
that due to the small counts contained in the categories of the target type variable, this variable
needed to be condensed to 3 categories, where 0 = unofficial targets, 1 = official government
targets, and 2 = other target types.
A total of 6 control variables are used. The control variables originating from the GTD
include: year of attack, season, day of week, and whether multiple terrorists were present (0 = no,
1 = yes). The 2 new control variables created from the open source materials include time of day
and whether the attack occurred in a capital city (0 = no, 1 = yes). As described in the
Descriptive Statistics section above, due the substantial missing values contained in the time of
day variable (over 50%), the variable was not incorporated into the multivariate models.
As noted in Table 3, missing values are only an issue for the Time of Day control
variable. All other variables do not have substantial missing values. Target location and terrorist
location have the largest percentage of missing values (at 27% and 17%, respectively). However,
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since these missing values do not exceed 30% for either variable, they are included in the
multivariate models.
As previously noted, the binary nature of the dependent variable indicates that a binary
logistic regression is the appropriate statistical test to use. A binary logistic regression contrasts
from a linear regression in that the relationship between the independent variables and the
dependent variable is not assumed to be linear. However, similar to linear regression, a logistic
regression does have some assumptions that need to be met. A violation of these assumptions can
result in biased coefficients and large standard errors, ultimately invalidating any statistical
inferences (Midi, Sarkar, & Rana, 2010). In a logistic regression, the following assumptions
should be met: no important variables are omitted, no unnecessary variables are included, errors
are binomially distributed, the independent variables are not linear combinations of each other,
and the observations are independent (Midi et al., 2010). The assumption that must be met in
both linear and logistic regressions is that the independent variables should not have strong linear
dependencies with each other (Midi et al., 2010). This is referred to as multicollinearity, where
two or more explanatory variables are highly related or correlated (Midi et al., 2010). If
multicollinearity exists, the resulting regression coefficients become unstable, and possibly
contain incorrect signs or magnitudes.
To detect multicollinearity, Midi et al. (2010) advocate for examining the diagnostics
produced in linear regression models. To produce these statistics, a linear regression model is
essentially run. To run the linear regression, dichotomous variables used in the logistic
regression need to be created for each category (except the reference) in the nominal independent
variables. The dependent variable from the logistic regression can still be used in the linear
model, or any other variable that is not an explanatory variable can be used as the dependent
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variable. The choice of dependent variable is not relevant since the multicollinearity statistics are
drawn from the predictor variables only (Midi et al., 2010). Once the linear model is conducted,
the resulting correlation coefficient matrix can be helpful in identifying collinearity. Specifically,
if the correlation coefficients are above 0.8 or 0.9, then multicollinearity may be an issue (Midi
et al., 2010). Midi et al. (2010) note, however, that the correlation matrix alone is not enough to
detect serious multicollinearity. Instead, the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistic should be
used to determine whether or not it is present. In general, if the VIF is above 10, then
multicollinearity could pose a problem for the model (Midi et al., 2010). High standard errors
can also be indicative of multicollinearity (Midi et al., 2010). Lastly, eigen values close to 0
indicate possible multicollinearity, as do condition index values greater than 15 (Midi et al.,
2010).
To solve multicollinearity, Midi et al. (2010) maintain that in some cases, variables can
be combined into one variable. In the event that it is not reasonable to combine variables, then
some variables can be eliminated from the model. The potential issue with this solution is that it
can be difficult to determine which variables to drop (Midi et al., 2010). One approach to limit
multicollinearity is to increase the sample size. However, this is not always feasible. Midi et al.
(2010) conclude that sometimes the solution to multicollinearity is to recognize its presence and
understand how it may impact the results. They note that while multicollinearity does not
substantially change the coefficient estimates, it does affect their reliability.
To produce the multicollinearity diagnostics, a linear regression was run using the same
dependent and independent variables that are used in the final logistic regression models. As
recommended by Midi et al. (2010), dummy variables were created for each category of every
categorical variable. Tables 9-10 display the correlation matrix. As seen in this matrix, none of
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the correlation coefficients are above 0.8 or 0.9, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue.
However, since the correlation matrix cannot necessarily detect serious multicollinearity, the VIF
statistics in the resulting regression coefficient table need to be examined. As seen in Table 11,
the VIF values are all below 10, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue. Finally, Table
12 shows that none of the condition index values are greater than 15, further supporting the
notion that multicollinearity is not present. Given these findings, it can be concluded that all of
the explanatory variables are appropriate to use in the binary logistic regression models.
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Partial Binary Logistic Regression Models
The results from the partial binary logistic model containing only the independent
variables are displayed in Table 13. The model is significant (χ2 = 906.86, p < .001) and
according to the Nagelkerke pseudo R2, it is a good fit (.606). A total of 8 independent variables
are significant: close proximity, victims struck, collateral deaths, terrorist location, target
motorcade, target location, weapon type, and security present. The variable with the most impact
on the model is the collateral deaths variable (Wald = 115.39). Ten hypotheses are supported,
and the opposite of what was predicted occurred for one variable (victims struck).
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Table 13: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, All Regions, Partial
Model (Independent Variables Only)
Independent Variable
β
Wald
SE
Odds Ratio
Hypothesis
Security Present
Sec. No Response
Security Responded

39.78
-.19

.86

.21

.83

-2.04

39.67

.32

.13***

Others Around

1.67

Only Family

-.09

.11

.27

.91

Only Bystanders

-.11

.38

.18

.89

Family & Bystanders

-.54

1.54

.43

.59

Weapon Type
2.08

77.93

.24

8.03***

Sticky Bombs

-.89

5.43

.38

.41*

Suicide

.22

.24

.44

1.24

Multiple

.57

1.36

.49

1.77

Other

.54

1.38

.46

1.71

Target Type
Other Target Type

-.03

.02

.18

.97

.43

1.71

.33

1.54

30.25

.21

.32***

.15

.06

.59

1.16

Inside

-.66

1.72

.50

.52

Work

-1.86

7.96

.66

.16**

Home

-1.79

22.73

.38

.17***

-1.40

22.54

.29

.25***

Target Motorcade
Terrorist Location

.28

1.60

.22

1.32

On Motorcycle

.48

4.45

.23

1.62*

Inside

.42

.90

.44

1.52

-.15

34.01

.03

.86***

.86

115.39

.08

2.35***

2.31

88.64

.25

10.02***

-1.12

12.16

.32

Collateral Deaths
Close Proximity
Constant

✓
✕
✕
✓
✓
✓

5.71

In Motor Vehicle

Victims Struck

✕
✕

43.35
-1.14

On Motorcycle

✓
✓
✕
✕
✕

2.33

Target Location
In Motor Vehicle

✕
✕
✕

108.20

Firearms

Official Target

✕
✓

.33***

✕
✓
✕
✕
✓
✓
✕

2

Model χ = 906.86*** df = 24
-2 Log Likelihood = 1169.71
2
Nagelkerke R = .606
N = 1498 [missing 558]
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or structure
(terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target location); Explosives
other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others present (others around); Security

73

not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday (day of week)

As predicted, successful assassinations are 10 times more likely when the terrorists are in
close proximity to their target compared to when they are not in close proximity (β = 2.31, OR =
10.02). Surprisingly, successful assassinations are also 14% less likely when higher numbers of
victims are struck compared to when lower numbers are struck (β = -0.15, OR = 0.86). In
alignment with what was hypothesized, attacks are 2.35 times more likely to be successful when
higher numbers of collateral deaths occur compared to when fewer deaths take place (β = 0.86,
OR = 2.35). In support of what was hypothesized, successful assassinations were 1.62 times
more likely to occur when terrorists are travelling on a motorcycle during the attack compared to
when terrorists attack from outside a building or structure (β = 0.48, OR = 1.62). As
hypothesized, successful assassinations are 75% less likely when a target is travelling in a
motorcade compared to when no motorcade is involved (β = -1.40, OR = 0.25). Several
hypotheses regarding the target’s location are supported. When the target is travelling in a motor
vehicle, the attack is 68% less likely to be successful compared to when the target is located
outside a physical building or structure (β = -1.14, OR = 0.32). Successful assassinations are
84% less likely when the target is at work compared to when they are outside during an attack (β
= -1.86, OR = 0.16). Successful attacks are 83% less likely when they occur when the target is at
their residence compared to when the target is outside (β = -1.79, OR = 0.17). Some of the
weapon type hypotheses are also supported in this model. Specifically, when the terrorists use
firearms, the attack is about 8 times more likely to be successful compared to when they use
explosives other than sticky bombs (β = 2.08, OR = 8.03). Attacks are 59% less likely to be
successful when sticky bombs are the weapon of choice compared to when terrorists use other
types of explosives (β = -0.89, OR = 0.41). Lastly, as predicted, assassinations are 87% less
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likely to be successful when security responds to the terrorists compared to when security is not
present at the scene of the attack (β = -2.04, OR = 0.13).
The results from the second partial binary logistic model, which contains all significant
independent variables from Table 13 along with the control variables, are shown in Table 14.
The model is significant (χ2 = 927.06, p < .001) and the fit is strong (Nagelkerke pseudo R2 =
0.62). The fit of this model is thus a slight improvement over the prior model. The same 8
independent variables from the first model remain significant: close proximity, victims struck,
collateral deaths, terrorist location, target motorcade, target location, weapon type, and security
present. The variable with the most impact on the model is also still the collateral deaths variable
(Wald = 111.94). The same ten hypotheses are supported, and the opposite of what was predicted
was found for the victims struck variable. However, the sticky bomb variable is marginally
significant (p < .10). Two control variables are also significant: year and day of the week
(Tuesday).

Table 14: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, All Regions, Partial
Model (Significant Independent Variables + Control Variables)
Independent Variable
β
Wald
SE
Odds Ratio
Hypothesis
Security Present
Sec. No Response
Security Responded

41.42
-.24

1.31

.21

.79

-2.10

41.41

.33

.12***

Weapon Type

51.13

Firearms

1.85

31.11

.33

6.39***

Sticky Bombs

-.72

3.56

.38

.49^

Suicide

.25

.33

.44

1.29

Multiple

.32

.36

.53

1.37

.272

.27

.53

1.31

Other
Target Location
In Motor Vehicle
On Motorcycle
Inside

✕
✓
✓
✓
✕
✕
✕

44.88
-1.20

33.21

.21

.30***

.06

.01

.59

1.06

-.73

2.08

.51

.48

✓
✕
✕
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Work

-1.94

8.74

.66

.14**

Home

-1.79

22.46

.38

.17***

-1.51

28.20

.28

.22***

Target Motorcade
Terrorist Location

7.01

In Motor Vehicle

.28

1.49

.23

1.32

On Motorcycle

.58

6.11

.23

1.78*

Inside

.34

.59

.44

1.41

-.16

38.14

.03

.85***

.85

111.94

.08

2.35***

2.29

84.95

.25

9.86***

Victims Struck
Collateral Deaths
Close Proximity
Day of Week

✕
✓
✕
✕
✓
✓

8.32

Monday

-.13

.25

.27

.88

Tuesday

.55

4.22

.27

1.73*

Wednesday

.13

.22

.27

1.14

Thursday

.09

.10

.28

1.09

Friday

.18

.40

.28

1.20

-.07

.06

.29

.93

Saturday

✓
✓
✓

Season

.94

Winter

.11

.24

.22

1.11

Spring

.08

.13

.21

1.08

Summer

.21

.91

.22

1.23

Year

-.12

15.49

.03

.89***

Capital City

-.14

.46

.20

.87

Multiple Terrorists

.25

.70

.30

233.37

15.32

59.62

Constant

1.28
2E+101***

2

Model χ = 927.06*** df = 31
-2 Log Likelihood = 1146.77
2
Nagelkerke R = .62
N = 1496 [missing 560]
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or structure
(terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target location); Explosives
other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others present (others around); Security
not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday (day of week)

Overall, the coefficients for the significant variables appear to remain relatively similar to
the coefficients in the first model in Table 14. In support of what was predicted, when terrorists
are in close proximity to their targets (i.e., within point-blank range), the assassination is 9.86
times more likely to be successful compared to when terrorists are not close to their targets (β =
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2.29, OR = 9.86). Contrary to what was predicted, successful assassinations are 15% less likely
to occur when higher numbers of victims are stuck (i.e., injuries and fatalities) compared to when
lower numbers of victims are struck (β = -0.16, OR = 0.85). As predicted, successful
assassinations are 2.35 times more likely to occur when higher numbers of collateral deaths
occur compared to when lower numbers of collateral deaths take place (β = 0.85, OR = 2.35).
When terrorists attack from a motorcycle, successful assassinations are 1.78 times more likely to
occur compared to when they attack while outside a building or structure (β = 0.58, OR = 1.78).
In support of what was hypothesized, when a target is located in a motor vehicle, an attack is
70% less likely to take place compared to when the target is outside (β = -1.20, OR = 0.30).
When a target is at work during an attack, the assassination is 86% less likely to occur compared
to when a target is outside (β = -1.94, OR = 0.14). An attack is 83% less likely to occur when the
target is at home compared to when the target is outside (β = -1.79, OR = 0.17). Successful
assassinations are 6.39 times more likely to occur when firearms are used during an attack
compared to explosives (β = 1.85, OR = 6.39). Although marginally significant, successful
attacks are 51% less likely to occur when sticky bombs are used compared to other types of
explosives (β = -0.72 OR = 0.49). As predicted, when security is present and responds to the
terrorists, successful assassinations are 88% less likely to occur compared to when security is not
present (β = -2.10, OR = 0.12). With regards to the control variables, successful assassinations
are 11% less likely as the years progress (β = -0.12, OR = 0.89). Successful attacks are 1.73
times more likely to occur on a Tuesday compared to a Sunday (β = 0.55, OR = 1.73).
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Full Binary Logistic Regression Model (All Regions)
The full model containing all independent and control variables is displayed in Table 15.
The model is significant (χ2 = 932.57, p < .001) and again represents a strong fit (Nagelkerke
pseudo R2 = 0.62). Compared to the previous two partial models, the fit of this model is
essentially the same. Like the prior two models, the same 8 independent variables are significant:
close proximity, victims struck, collateral deaths, terrorist location, target motorcade, target
location, weapon type, and security present. The variable with the most impact is still the
collateral deaths variable (Wald = 110.49). Also, the same ten hypotheses are supported. In
contrast to the last model and similar to the first, the sticky bomb variable is no longer
marginally significant, at p < .05. The same two control variables are significant: year and day of
the week (Tuesday).

Table 15: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, All Regions, Full
Model
Independent Variable
β
Wald
SE
Odds Ratio
Hypothesis
Security Present
Sec. No Response
Security Responded

39.61
-.24

1.27

.21

.79

-2.07

39.59

.33

.13***

Others Around

2.78

Only Family

-.15

.28

.28

.86

Only Bystanders

-.14

.55

.19

.87

Family & Bystanders

-.69

2.56

.43

.50

Weapon Type
1.90

32.28

.33

6.66***

Sticky Bombs

-.83

4.56

.39

.44*

Suicide

.26

.35

.44

1.30

Multiple

.41

.59

.53

1.50

Other

.30

.32

.53

1.35

Target Type
Other Target Type
Target Location

✕
✕
✕

52.70

Firearms

Official Target

✕
✓

✓
✓
✕

2.54
-.02

.01

.19

.98

.47

1.92

.34

1.59

✕
✕

41.71
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In Motor Vehicle

-1.17

30.60

.21

.31***

.11

.03

.60

1.11

Inside

-.73

2.03

.51

.48

Work

-1.95

8.64

.66

.14**

Home

-1.75

20.58

.39

.17***

-1.43

22.83

.30

.24***

On Motorcycle

Target Motorcade
Terrorist Location

7.47

In Motor Vehicle

.30

1.67

.23

1.35

On Motorcycle

.60

6.38

.24

1.81*

Inside

.39

.76

.45

1.48

-.15

32.99

.03

.86***

.85

110.49

.08

2.33***

2.32

86.04

.25

10.13***

Victims Struck
Collateral Deaths
Close Proximity
Day of Week

✕
✓
✕
✕
✓
✓

8.61

Monday

-.15

.30

.27

.86

Tuesday

.54

4.14

.27

1.72*

Wednesday

.14

.25

.27

1.15

Thursday

.05

.03

.28

1.05

Friday

.16

.30

.29

1.17

Saturday
Season

-.11

.14
1.05

.29

.90

Winter

.12

.30

.22

1.13

Spring

.09

.16

.21

1.09

Summer
Year
Capital City

.22
-.12
-.12

1.02
16.52
.35

.22
.03
.20

1.24
.89***
.89

Multiple Terrorists

.22

.52

.30

1.24

243.04

16.35

60.11

Constant

✓
✕
✕
✓
✓
✓

4E+105***

2

Model χ = 932.57*** df = 36
-2 Log Likelihood = 1141.26
2
Nagelkerke R = .62
N = 1496 [missing 560]
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or structure
(terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target location); Explosives
other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others present (others around); Security
not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday (day of week)

The coefficients in this model also appear to remain similar to the coefficients in the first
two models. As hypothesized, successful assassinations are 10.13 times more likely to occur
when terrorists are in close proximity to their targets compared to when they are not in close
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proximity (β = 2.32, OR = 10.13). Contrary to what was predicted, successful assassinations are
14% less likely to take place when there are high numbers of victims struck compared to when
there are lower numbers of victims struck (β = -0.15, OR = 0.86). As predicted, successful
attacks are 2.33 times more likely to take place when high numbers of collateral deaths occur
compared to when low number of collateral deaths take place (β = 0.85, OR = 2.33). When
terrorists are using a motorcycle during an attack, a successful assassination is 1.81 times more
likely to occur compared to when terrorists attack from outside a building or structure (β = 0.60,
OR = 1.81). In support of what was hypothesized, a successful assassination is 76% times more
likely to take place when the target is travelling in a motorcade compared to when no motorcade
is involved (β = -1.43, OR = 0.24). Results support the target location variables. Specifically,
when a target is located in a motor vehicle during an attack, a successful assassination is 69%
less likely to occur compared to if the target is outside (β = -1.17, OR = 0.31). A successful
assassination is 86% less likely to occur when the target is at work during an attack compared to
if they are outside (β = -1.95, OR = 0.14). A successful attack is 83% less likely to take place
when the target is located in their residence compared to when they are outside (β = -1.75, OR =
0.17). Results are also supportive of the weapon type hypotheses. Successful assassinations are
6.66 times more likely to use firearms compared to explosives (β = 1.90, OR = 6.66). A
successful attack is 56% less like to occur when a sticky bomb is used compared to other types of
explosives (β = -0.83, OR = 0.44). As predicted, successful assassinations are 87% less likely to
occur when security responds to the terrorists compared to when no security is present during the
attack (β = -2.07, OR = 0.13). The same control variables from the prior partial model remain
significant in this full model. Specifically, successful assassinations are 11% less likely every

80

additional year (β = -0.12, OR = 0.89). In addition, successful attacks are 1.72 times more likely
to occur on a Tuesday compared to a Sunday (β = 0.54, OR = 1.72).
Overall, the full model containing all independent and control variables appears to be the
best fitting model, as it explains the largest portion of the variance in successful assassinations
(62%).

Regional Binary Logistic Regression Models
Middle East & North Africa
The binary logistic regression results for the Middle East & North Africa model are seen
in Table 16. This model is significant (χ2 = 472.49, p < .001) and the fit is very strong
(Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.71). This model thus illustrates an improvement in fit compared to
the previous partial and full models. Similar to the prior three models, the same 8 independent
variables remain significant: close proximity, victims struck, collateral deaths, terrorist location,
target motorcade, target location, weapon type, and security present. However, unlike the
previous models, an additional weapon type hypothesis is supported (suicide) along with one of
the hypotheses for capable guardians (family & bystanders present). In addition, the terrorist
location variable is marginally significant in this model (p < .10) when it was significant in the
full model (p < .05). These findings suggest that there are some regional differences regarding
the correlates of successful assassinations in the Middle East. Overall, this model shows that a
total of 10 variables are significant, including 9 independent variables and one control variable.
A total of 11 hypotheses are supported, and the opposite of what was predicted for one
hypotheses was found (victims struck). Like the prior models, the variable with the most impact
is the collateral deaths variable (Wald = 61.26). In contrast to the previous models, the day of the
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week control variable is no longer significant. However, the year control variable remains
significant.

Table 16: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, Middle East &
North Africa
Independent Variable
β
Wald
SE
Odds Ratio
Hypothesis
13.39
Security Present
Sec. No Response

-.45

1.35

.38

.64

Security Responded

-2.89

13.09

.80

.06***

11.83

Others Around
Only Family

-.01

.00

.52

1.00

Only Bystanders

-.13

.12

.37

.88

Family & Bystanders

-5.37

11.78

1.57

.01**

22.94

Weapon Type
Firearms

1.55

4.36

.74

4.71*

Sticky Bombs

-1.69

8.81

.57

.19**

Suicide

2.16

5.92

.89

8.64*

Multiple

.09

.00

1.96

1.10

Other

.22

.03

1.25

1.25

1.72

Target Type
Official Target

.13

.12

.38

1.14

Other Target Type

.75

1.59

.59

2.12

28.38

Target Location
In Motor Vehicle

-2.12

20.49

.47

.12***

Inside

2.23

2.70

1.36

9.32

Work

-1.45

1.28

1.28

.23

Home

-1.87

4.84

.85

.15*

-1.51

8.52

.52

.22**

Target Motorcade

4.57

Terrorist Location
In Motor Vehicle

.36

.97

.36

1.43

On Motorcycle

1.39

3.60

.73

4.01^

Inside

-.62

.30

1.12

.54

Victims Struck

-.21

16.73

.05

.81***

Collateral Deaths

1.46

61.26

.19

4.31***

Close Proximity

3.56

39.40

.57

35.26***

4.74

Day of Week
Monday

-.29

.37

.48

.75

Tuesday

.65

2.06

.46

1.92

Wednesday

.13

.07

.48

1.14

Thursday

.24

.21

.52

1.27

Friday

.34

.44

.52

1.41
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.31

.31

.56

1.36

Winter

-.07

.32
.03

.39

.93

Spring

-.07

.03

.38

.93

Summer

.12

.09

.39

1.13

Year

-.13

6.87

.05

.88**

Capital City
Multiple Terrorists

-.14
.94

.21
1.66

.30
.73

.87
2.56

Constant

259.80

6.80

99.63

7E+112**

Saturday
Season

2

Model χ = 472.49*** df = 35
-2 Log Likelihood = 380.61
2
Nagelkerke R = .71
N = 623 [missing 233]
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or structure
(terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target location); Explosives
other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others present (others around); Security
not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday (day of week)

In support of what was hypothesized, successful assassinations are roughly 35 times more
likely to occur when terrorists are in close proximity to their targets compared to when they are
not in close proximity (β = 3.56, OR = 35.26). In contrast to what was hypothesized, successful
assassinations are 19% less likely to occur when higher numbers of victims are struck compared
to when lower numbers of victims are struck (β = -0.21, OR = 0.81). When higher numbers of
collateral deaths occur, then attacks are about 4 times more likely to result in a successful
assassination compared to when lower numbers of collateral deaths occur (β = 1.46, OR = 4.31).
As hypothesized, attacks are 4 times more likely to be successful when the terrorists are on a
motorcycle compared to if they attack from outside a building or structure (β = 1.39, OR = 4.01).
As noted earlier, this finding is marginally significant (p < .10). As hypothesized, successful
assassinations are 78% less likely to occur when the target is traveling in a motorcade compared
to if no motorcade is involved (β = -1.51, OR = 0.22). Two of the hypotheses in the target
location variables are also supported. When a target is travelling in a motor vehicle, a successful
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assassination is 88% less likely to occur compared to if the target is outside a building or
structure during an attack (β = -2.12, OR = 0.12). When the target is at home during an attack, an
assassination is 85% less likely to be successful compared to if the target is outside (β = -1.87,
OR = 0.15). Three of the weapon type hypotheses are supported. Successful assassinations are
4.71 times more likely to occur when a firearm is used compared to an explosive (β = 1.55, OR =
4.71). Successful attacks are 81% less like when sticky bombs are used compared to other types
of explosives (β = -1.69, OR = 0.19). Attacks are 8.64 times more likely to be successful when
suicide attacks are used compared to other types of explosives (β = 2.16, OR = 8.64). As
predicted, when family of the target and bystanders are present during an attack, a successful
assassination is 99% less likely to take place (β = -5.37, OR = 0.01). With regards to the
significant control variable, successful assassinations are 12% less likely every additional year (β
= -2.89, OR = 0.06).
To summarize, the Middle East specific regression model is similar to the previous partial
and full regressions in that it contains the same significant variables. However, it is also supports
additional hypotheses that were not significant in the prior models (suicide, family & bystanders
present). Lastly, unlike the prior models, the day of the week control variable is no longer
significant. These findings illustrate the importance of disaggregating the full regression model
into individual region models, as this approach can assist us in understanding whether there are
regional differences in the impact of SCP on successful assassinations.

South Asia
The results for the South Asia model are displayed in Table 17. This model is significant
(χ2 = 356.86, p < .001) and represents a strong fit (Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.67). Like the
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Middle East model, these results show an improvement in fit compared to the partial and full
models. Due to the low counts in some of the variables, some categories had to be condensed.
For the target location variable, the target on a motorcycle was combined with the target in motor
vehicle variable. For the weapon type variable, sticky bombs were combined with the other
weapon type category.
Table 17: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, South Asia
Independent Variable
β
Wald
SE
Odds Ratio Hypothesis
Security Present
Sec. No Response
Security Responded

14.25
-.16

.17

.38

.85

-2.14

14.13

.57

.12***

Others Around
Only Family

.83
-.42

.53

.58

.65

Only Bystanders

.01

.00

.33

1.01

Family & Bystanders

.32

.21

.70

1.38

Weapon Type
Firearms

22.94

.76

38.64***

Suicide

.27

.16

.66

1.31

Multiple

2.17

5.87

.90

8.74**

Other

1.74

4.73

.80

5.69**

Target Type
Other Target Type
Target Location
In Motor Vehicle or
Motorcycle

-.26

.50

.37

.77

.34

.43

.52

1.41

.43

.23**

Inside

-.99

1.46

.82

.37

Work

-2.42

6.04

.98

.09**

Home

-.97

1.70

.75

.38

-1.66

9.16

.55

.19**

Terrorist Location
On Motorcycle
Inside
Victims Struck
Collateral Deaths
Close Proximity
Day of Week

✕
✕

14.40
11.51

In Motor Vehicle

✓
✕

1.46

-1.45

Target Motorcade

✕
✕
✕

25.76
3.65

Official Target

✕
✓

✓
✕
✓
✕
✓

6.18
-.61

1.11

.58

.55

.68

3.32

.38

1.98^

-.78

.94

.80

.46

-.14

23.42

.03

.87***

.82

38.35

.13

2.26***

2.67

39.63

.43

14.50***

✕
✓
✕
✕
✓
✓

17.90
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Monday

-.31

.39

.50

.73

Tuesday

.70

1.98

.50

2.01

-.14

.07

.53

.87

.52

.93

.54

1.68

-.97

3.08

.55

.38^

-1.10

4.44

.52

.33*

Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Season

.80

Winter

-.04

.01

.41

.96

Spring

-.08

.04

.39

.93

.25

.39

.41

1.29

Year

-.19

8.12

.07

.83**

Capital City

-.00

.00

.91

1.00

Summer

Multiple Terrorists
Constant

-1.41

3.88

.72

382.35

8.09

134.47

.24*
1E+166

2

Model χ = 356.86*** df = 34
-2 Log Likelihood = 345.60
2
Nagelkerke R = .67
N = 508 [missing 187]
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or
structure (terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target
location); Explosives other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others
present (others around); Security not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday
(day of week)

Similar to the prior three models, several independent variables remain significant: close
proximity, victims struck, collateral deaths, terrorist location, target motorcade, target location,
weapon type, and security present. In contrast to the partial and full models, two additional
categories in the weapon type variable are supported (multiple weapons; other weapon types)
along with one of the hypotheses for target location (target at work). Unlike the Middle East
model, the target home and family & bystanders present variables are not significant in this
model. Also similar to the Middle East model, the terrorist location variable is marginally
significant (p < .10), and the year control variable remains significant. The multiple terrorists
present and day of the week control variables are significant. Interestingly, different days are
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significant for this model when compared to the partial and full models. Specifically, Friday (p <
.10) and Saturday are significant. In this model, a total of 8 hypotheses are supported, and the
opposite of what was predicted for one hypotheses was discovered (victims struck). A total of 11
variables are significant: 8 independent variables and 3 control variables. The variable with the
most impact on the South Asia model is the close proximity variable (Wald = 39.63). This
represents a departure from all of the prior models, where the collateral deaths variable had the
largest impact.
As hypothesized, successful assassinations are 14.5 times more likely when terrorists
attack in close proximity to their targets compared to when they are not in close proximity (β =
2.67, OR = 14.50). In contrast to what was predicted, successful assassinations are 13% less
likely when higher numbers of victims are struck compared to when lower numbers are struck (β
= -0.14, OR = 0.87). As predicted, when higher numbers of collateral deaths take place, a
successful attack is 2.26 times more likely to occur compared to when lower numbers of
collateral deaths take place (β = 0.82, OR = 2.26). In support of what was hypothesized,
successful attacks are almost 2 times more likely to occur when the terrorist is on a motorcycle,
as opposed to being located outside a building or structure, during an attack (β = 0.68, OR =
1.98). Two of the target location hypotheses are supported. Successful assassinations are 77%
less likely when the target is traveling in a motor vehicle or motorcycle compared to when they
are outside (β = -1.45, OR = 0.23). When the target is attacked at their place of work, a
successful assassination is 91% less likely to occur compared to when the target is outside (β = 2.42, OR = 0.09). Three of the weapon type variables are significant. When firearms are used
instead of explosives, successful assassinations are almost 39 times more likely to occur (β =
3.65, OR = 38.64). When multiple weapon types are used during an attack, successful
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assassinations are almost 9 times more likely compared to when only explosives employed (β =
2.17, OR = 8.74). Successful attacks are 5.69 times more likely when other weapon types are
used during an attack (this category is inclusive of sticky bombs) compared to explosives (β =
1.74, OR = 5.69). As predicted, when security responds to the terrorists, an assassination is 88%
less likely to take place compared to when no security is present (β = -2.14, OR = 0.12).
Regarding the control variables, successful assassinations are 17% less likely with every
additional year (β = -0.19, OR = 0.83). Successful assassinations are 76% less likely when
multiple terrorists are present at the scene of the attack compared to when single terrorists are
present (β = -1.41, OR = 0.24). When attacks occur on a Friday compared to a Sunday, an
assassination is 62% less likely to occur (although this is marginally significant, where p < .10).
When an assassination occurs on a Saturday compared to a Sunday, an assassination is 67% less
likely to take place.
Overall, the South Asia model appears similar to the partial and full regression models, as
it contains several of the same significant variables. However, like the Middle East model,
additional variables are significant. Specifically, the target at work hypothesis is supported, and
the weapon type categories for multiple weapons and other weapon types are significant. This
model also differs from the results of the Middle East model, in that the Middle East model
found the target home category to be significant, along with the category for family & bystanders
present. Similar to all of the prior models, the year control variable remains significant.
However, contrary to the other models, the multiple terrorists present control variable is also
significant. While the partial and full models found the day of the week control variable to be
significant, different days are significant in this model (Friday and Saturday). Interestingly, day
of the week was not significant in the Middle East model. Like the Middle East model, these
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results indicate that a regional analysis is valuable to determining the effects of SCP on
successful assassinations.

Southeast Asia
Results for the Southeast Asia model are shown in Table 18. This model is significant (χ2
= 109.098, p < .001) and the fit is very strong (Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.72). This model
represents an improved fit compared to the partial and full models. Similar to the South Asia
model, low counts were found for some of the variables and/or categories, and as a result, some
had to be condensed to run the model. Specifically, the target inside and target work categories
were combined with the target home variable, so target inside is inclusive of work and home. For
the weapon type variable, cases with multiple weapon types were recoded to whatever weapon
was noted as the primary weapon. In addition, other weapon types were coded as missing since
there were so few cases where other weapon types were used.

Table 18: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, Southeast Asia
Independent Variable
β
Wald
SE
Odds Ratio Hypothesis
Security Present

4.08

Sec. No Response

-2.56

4.07

1.27

.08*

Security Responded

-1.02

.53

1.41

.36

Others Around
Only Family
Only Bystanders
Family & Bystanders
Firearms
Official Target

✓
✕

2.94
-1.28

1.97

.91

.28

-.94

1.13

.89

.39

-2.08

1.58

1.66

.13

3.20

3.86

1.63

24.48*

-1.48

2.49

.93

.23

Target Location

✕
✕
✕
✓
✕

1.99

In Motor Vehicle

-.38

.15

.96

.69

On Motorcycle

-.13

.02

1.08

.87

✕
✕
89

Inside
Target Motorcade

-1.70

1.94

1.22

.18

.12

.01

1.61

1.13

Terrorist Location
In Motor Vehicle

2.25
-1.50

1.21

1.36

.22

On Motorcycle

.59

.59

.77

1.81

Inside

.47

.06

1.86

1.60

Victims Struck

-.37

2.38

.24

.69

Collateral Deaths

2.16

12.69

.61

8.67***

Close Proximity

4.29

8.65

1.46

72.70**

Day of Week
-.14

.01

1.30

.87

Tuesday

-.51

.15

1.33

.60

Wednesday

.15

.01

1.37

1.16

Thursday

.78

.39

1.26

2.19

1.22

.79

1.37

3.37

.23

.03

1.36

1.26

Saturday

✕
✕
✕
✕
✓
✓

2.35

Monday

Friday

✕
✕

Season

2.75

Winter

-.39

.18

.93

.68

Spring

1.15

1.42

.96

3.15

.43

.19

.99

1.54

-.28

3.16

.16

.76^

.18

.01

1.91

1.20

Summer
Year
Capital City
Multiple Terrorists
Constant

.08

.01

1.00

552.25

3.15

311.19

1.08
7E+239^

2

Model χ = 109.908*** df = 29
-2 Log Likelihood = 81.113
2
Nagelkerke R = .724
N = 147 [missing 63]
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or structure
(terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target location); Explosives
other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others present (others around); Security
not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday (day of week)

Several similar independent variables remain significant in this model when compared to
the prior models: close proximity, collateral deaths, weapon type, and security present. In
contrast to the other models, the following variables are no longer significant: victims struck,
terrorist location, target motorcade, and target location. Additionally, a different category for the
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security present variable is significant in this model (security present but did not respond), while
the security responded category was instead significant in all of the other models. Similar to all
of the previous model, the year control variable remains significant, although marginally (p <
.10). In this model, a total of 4 hypotheses are supported. A total of 5 variables are significant: 4
independent variables, and 1 control variable. The variable with the most impact on the
Southeast Asia model is the collateral deaths variable (Wald = 12.69), which is consistent with
all of the previous models except South Asia, where the close proximity variable instead had the
most impact.
As predicted, successful assassinations are 72.7 times more likely when terrorists are in
close proximity to their targets compared to when they are not in close proximity (β = 4.29, OR
= 72.7). In support of what was hypothesized, when more collateral deaths occur during an
attack, it is 8.67 times more likely to be successful compared to when lower numbers of deaths
occur (β = 2.16, OR = 8.67). As hypothesized, successful assassinations are 24.48 times more
likely to take place when terrorists use firearms compared to explosives (β = 3.20, OR = 24.48).
Lastly, when security is present but does not respond to the terrorists, a successful assassination
is 92% less likely compared to when security is not present (β = -2.56, OR = 0.08). With regards
to the year control variable, successful assassinations are 24% less likely as the years progress,
although this finding is marginally significant (p < .10) (β = -0.28, OR = 0.76).
In sum, the Southeast Asia model contains several of the same significant variables that
were found in the prior models. However, unlike the previous models, a new category in the
security present variable is significant (security present but does not respond). This is interesting
since the category for security responded was significant in the other models. In addition, several
variables that were significant in the other models failed to reach significance in this model
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(victims struck, terrorist location, target motorcade, and target location). Similar to the previous
models, the year control variable is significant, although marginally (p < .10).

Sub Saharan Africa
The results for the Sub Saharan Africa model are displayed in Table 19. This model is
significant (χ2 = 147.209, p < .001) and very strong (Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.89). Of all of the
models, this model is the best fitting, as it has the highest Nagelkerke pseudo R2 value compared
to the others. Similar to the South Asia and Southeast Asia models, low counts were found for
some of the variables due to the small sample size. For this model, the categories for the target
type variable had to be condensed. Specifically, the other target type category was recoded to
unofficial. For the weapon type variable, cases with multiple weapon types were recoded to
indicate whatever primary weapon type was used. Additionally, sticky and suicide bombs were
combined into the explosive category, while other weapon types were recoded as missing. Thus,
the weapon type variable contains two categories: firearms and explosives. For the target
location variable, the target work and target home categories were combined with the target
inside category. Thus, the target inside category is inclusive of work and home. For the terrorist
location variable, the motorcycle and motor vehicle categories were combined. The others
around variable was changed to a dichotomous indicator of yes vs. no due to a low count in the
only family and family & bystanders categories.
Table 19: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, Sub Saharan Africa
Independent Variable
β
Wald
SE
Odds Ratio
Hypothesis
Security Present

7.75
2.92

5.32

1.27

18.52*

✕

-1.67

1.74

1.26

.19

Others Around

-.54

.37

.89

.58

Firearms

2.80

3.16

1.58

16.48^

✕
✕
✓

Sec. No Response
Security Responded
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Official Target

-.33

Target Location
In Motor Vehicle
Inside
Target Motorcade
Terrorist Location
In Motor Vehicle or
Motorcycle

.10

1.04

.72

✕
✕
✓
✓

5.78
-.27

.07

1.01

.76

-4.26

5.59

1.80

.01*

-3.64

4.99

1.63

.03*

2.34
1.16

1.26

1.03

3.20

2.41

1.73

1.83

11.16

Victims Struck

-.58

5.46

.25

.56*

Collateral Deaths

1.25

10.59

.38

3.49**

Close Proximity

4.02

9.38

1.31

55.54**

Inside

Day of Week

4.39

Monday

1.27

.95

1.30

3.54

Tuesday

.37

.09

1.25

1.45

-.28

.05

1.21

.76

-2.02

.85

2.20

.13

Friday

-.13

.01

1.32

.88

Saturday
Season

2.66

1.78
1.08

1.99

14.32

Winter

-1.07

.69

1.29

.34

Spring

-.47

.23

.97

.63

Summer
Year

-.95
-.33

.92
2.18

.98
.22

.39
.72

Capital City

.36

.18

.85

1.43

Wednesday
Thursday

Multiple Terrorists
Constant

✕
✕
✕
✓
✓

3.32

4.92

1.50

656.06

2.15

447.50

27.66*
8E+284

2

Model χ = 147.209*** df = 35
-2 Log Likelihood = 38.554
2
Nagelkerke R = .889
N = 134 [missing 54]
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or structure
(terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target location); Explosives
other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others present (others around); Security
not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday (day of week)

Several variables that were found to be significant in the prior models remain significant
in this model. These include: close proximity, victims struck, collateral deaths, target motorcade,
weapon type, and security presence. Some variables that were significant in the partial, full,
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Middle East, and South Asia models are no longer significant: target motorcade and year. For
this model, target inside is now significant. Interestingly, similar to the Southeast Asia model, the
category of security present but not responding is significant. However, unlike the Southeast
Asia model, this category is significant in the opposite of what was expected. Overall, the
opposite of what was hypothesized was found for two hypotheses: victims struck and security
present but did not respond. With regards to control variables, this model is the only model
where year is not significant. Similar to the South Asia model, the control variable for multiple
terrorists is significant in this model. The results for this model show that a total of 5 hypotheses
are supported, and a total of 8 variables are significant: 7 independent variables and 1 control
variable. Similar to all of the models except the South Asia model, the collateral deaths variable
exerts the largest influence on the model (Wald = 10.59).
As hypothesized, successful assassinations are 55.54 times more likely when terrorists
are in close proximity to their targets compared to when they are not in close proximity (β =
4.02, OR = 55.54). In contrast to what was predicted, successful assassinations are 44% less
likely when higher numbers of victims are struck compared to when lower numbers are struck (β
= -0.58, OR = 0.56). As predicted, successful assassinations are 3.49 times more likely when
higher numbers of collateral deaths occur compared to when lower numbers occur (β = 1.25, OR
= 3.49). Also as hypothesized, attackers are 97% less likely when a target is in a motorcade
compared to when they are not in a motorcade (β = -3.64, OR = 0.03). As predicted, successful
assassinations are 99% less likely when the target is inside (inclusive of at work or home)
compared to when they are located outside a physical building or structure (β = -4.26, OR =
0.01). Although marginally significant (p < .10), attacks are 16.48 times more likely to be
successful when firearms are used compared to explosives (β = 2.80, OR = 16.48). In contrast to
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what was hypothesized, successful assassinations are 18.52 times more likely to occur when
security is present but does not respond compared to when no security is present at the scene of
the attack (β = 2.92, OR = 18.52). Lastly, when multiple terrorists are present at the scene
compared to individual terrorists, successful assassinations are 27.66 times more likely to occur
(β = 3.32, OR = 27.66).
Overall, the Sub Saharan Africa model contains several of the same statistically
significant variables that are present in the previous partial, full, and regional models. In contrast
to the previous models, the target inside category is significant (although this category was
condensed to include both home and work categories), and the opposite of what was predicted
was discovered for one of the categories for the security present variable (security present but did
not respond). Interestingly, like the Southeast Asia model but unlike the others, the target
motorcade variable is not significant. Also in contrast to most of the other models, the terrorist
location variable is not significant here. Interestingly, this is the only model where the year
control variable is not significant. However, similar to the South Asia model, the multiple
terrorists control variable is significant.

Results Summary
A summary of significant predictor variables across the full and regional models is
displayed in Table 20. As this table shows, several variables remain consistently significant, and
in the same direction, across each model. These include: close proximity, collateral deaths, and
weapon type (firearms). The security present variable is also significant across all of the models,
but the security present and responded hypothesis is significant for the full model, the Middle
East model, and the South Asia model. In contrast, the security present but did not respond
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hypothesis is significant in the Southeast Asia and Sub Saharan Africa model. However, the
category is negatively associated with successful assassinations for the Southeast Asia model and
positively associated with successful attacks in the Sub Saharan Africa model. Additionally, the
victims struck and target motorcade variables are significant in all of the models except the
Southeast Asia model. The terrorists on motorcycle hypothesis is significant for three of the
models (full, Middle East, and South Asia), and insignificant in the Southeast Asia and Sub
Saharan Africa model. The target in motor vehicle category is significant in both the full and
Middle East models, while the condensed target in motor vehicle or motorcycle category is
significant in the South Asia model. The target at work hypothesis is significant in the full and
South Asia models, while the target at home hypothesis is significant in the full and Middle East
model. The target inside hypothesis is significant in the Sub Saharan Africa model, although this
category was condensed to include the work and home categories. Some variables are uniquely
associated with some models and not others. For example, sticky bombs are significant in both
the full model and the Middle East model, while the suicide attack hypothesis is supported for
only the Middle East model. The multiple weapons and other weapon type categories are
significant in the South Asia model, while the family & bystanders category is significant in only
the Middle East model.
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Overall, all of the regional models show an improved fit compared to the partial and full
models, accounting for a higher percentage of the variance in successful assassinations. As
discussed above, several variables are consistently significant across each model. However, some
differences exist when the regional models are compared, with certain variables being uniquely
associated with some regions and not others. Lastly, it is worth noting that a potential limitation
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with the regional models is that the sample size reduces substantially. As shown in Table 20, the
sample sizes for the Southeast Asia (N = 147) and Sub Saharan Africa (N = 134) models are
substantially lower than the Middle East & North Africa (N = 623) and South Asia (N = 508)
models. The smaller sample sizes for these models may explain why fewer variables are
significant compared to the full model and the Middle East and South Asia models, which have
substantially larger sample sizes. Future research can therefore focus on particular regions and
obtain larger sample sizes to more fully tease out the regional contexts in which SCP specific
variables influence successful assassinations.

CH. 7: DISCUSSION

The results from all of the regression models are supportive of using SCP to examine
successful assassinations conducted by terrorists. This approach can assist researchers, policy
makers, and practitioners in the development of effective counterterrorism measures directed
towards the prevention and disruption of assassination attacks. As demonstrated by each model,
findings support various SCP themes, including capable guardianship, weapon type, target
location, terrorist location, attack intensity, and distance. Additionally, while some regional
differences exist regarding the impact of SCP variables on successful attacks, the influence of
several SCP themes is largely consistent across the different regions examined in this study.
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Full Model
Capable Guardianship
Results from the full regression model testing the effect of SCP variables on all regions
(Table 15) demonstrate support for the role capable guardianship in Cohen and Felson’s (1979)
routine activities theory. Specifically, when security is present and responds to terrorists during
an assassination, the attack is less likely to be successful compared to when no security is
present. This parallels the results by Mandala and Freilich (2017a), who similarly find security
response to be significantly related to successful assassinations. Also similar to Mandala and
Freilich’s (2017a) study, this model finds that the presence of security alone is not associated
with successful assassinations. Relatedly, the hypotheses for informal capable guardians in the
form of others present at the scene (i.e., family of the target, bystanders) are not significantly
associated with successful assassinations, suggesting that the most effective guardians for
disrupting an assassination are armed security guards or police. These findings further indicate
that security personnel not only need to be armed, but they also need to have an opportunity to
respond successfully deflect an assassination and protect the target. As explained by Mandala
and Freilich (2017a), security must have the ability to realize when an attack is either imminent
or when it is actually taking place. This finding is directly related to training, as security
personnel must have sufficient training to recognize when an opportunity exists to effectively
retaliate against terrorists when attacked.
There are many historical examples of alert and trained security personnel disrupting
terrorist attacks. For example, in the winter of 1999-2000, an al Qaeda terrorist tried to enter the
U.S. through Canada to bomb Los Angeles International Airport. The disruption of this plan is
credited to a Customs inspector who questioned the terrorist after finding his behavior suspicious
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(9/11 Commission, 2004). History similarly provides examples of the detrimental impact lapses
in security can have in creating opportunities for attacks. For instance, the 9/11 Commission
Report finds that when they arrived for their flights on September 11th, over half of the hijackers
had been flagged by the Federal Aviation Authority’s (FAA) profiling system, known as the
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS). Despite being flagged by this
system, only their bags were subjected to additional inspection. Thus, had security taken
additional steps to screen the flagged hijackers, some of the hijackers may have been prevented
from boarding their planes on 9/11.
This finding supports Clarke and Newman’s (2006) target selection criteria (EVIL
DONE), where terrorists select targets that they deem as easy to attack. When security guards are
able to respond to terrorists during an attack, the effort required for the terrorists to successfully
assassinate their target is substantially increased. The target is not “easy” to attack when it is
protected by armed, capable and skilled security personnel. Since terrorists are less likely to
select targets that they see as difficult to successfully attack (Gruenewald et al., 2015; Klein et
al., 2016), target-hardening measures, like armed security guards, are essential in preventing
against successful assassinations. Interestingly, these findings align with Fein and Vossekuil’s
(1999) study of attackers and near-lethal approachers of public figures in the U.S. The authors
find that subjects choose their targets based off of their assessment that an opportunity to attack
exists, as well as if the attack would fulfill their goals. In addition, subjects are known to
abandon their attack plans if they believe that they will not be successful.
A review of this study’s various open source materials highlights the importance of
formal guardianship (i.e., police, security guards) in protecting targets and disrupting
assassination attacks. For example, in several of the unsuccessful cases, police discovered and
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defused bombs before they could detonate and harm the target. In other cases, vigilant security
personnel disrupted attacks by identifying suicide bombers through their suspicious behavior and
then shielding the target from the bomber. In one unsuccessful attack, the terrorists concealed
pistols in their boots and passed through numerous security checks undetected. However, at the
last security checkpoint, a guard became suspicious and effectively stopped the terrorists from
harming the target. Several of the successful assassination cases demonstrate the severe
repercussions stemming from ineffective security. In some incidents, lax security was cited as a
reason why the terrorists were successful. One example is the assassination of former Pakistan
Prime Minister Banazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007. In this case, the open source material
notes that Bhutto had asked for increased protection in the form of a police escort along with
jamming devices against bombs, but the government denied this request. Bhutto was assassinated
while waving to her supporters through the sunroof of her vehicle, and the security that was
present was blamed for allowing people to get too close to her. These examples illustrate the
utility of security checkpoints in protecting vulnerable targets, as well as the critical role that
effectively trained security personnel play in disrupting assassinations. Breakdowns in security,
as seen in the Bhutto case, create opportunities for terrorists to easily attack their targets. Armed
security personnel and checkpoints increase the effort required for terrorists to successfully
access and kill their targets. These measures also increase the risks involved for terrorists, as they
are more likely to be discovered and captured.

Weapons
As predicted, successful assassinations are more likely when terrorists use firearms,
rather than explosives. Similarly, Mandala and Freilich (2017a; 2017b), find firearms to be
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associated with successful assassinations. This result aligns with Clarke and Newman’s (2006)
weapons opportunity pillar and acronym for terrorist weapon selection (MURDEROUS). In
addition, this finding supports the SCP techniques of increasing the effort, increasing the risks,
and reducing the rewards for terrorists. Since terrorists are known to prefer uncomplicated
weapons that are easy to use and obtain over more sophisticated weapons, it is not surprising that
firearms are associated with successful assassinations. Firearms are not as complex as
explosives, and therefore require little training and skill to use. As a result, less effort required of
terrorists to use firearms. Firearms allow terrorists to increase their rewards, since they are more
effective than explosives at murdering specific individuals over large groups of people (see
Mandala & Freilich, 2017a; 2017b). Firearms are also less risky for terrorists since they are
easily obtainable and concealable, and thus more likely to go undetected than explosives
(Jasparro, 2010; Gill & Corner, 2016). This finding aligns with Legault and Hendrickson’s
(2009) study, where terrorists were found to be more likely than other felons to be convicted of
firearm-related crimes.
This model also supports the hypothesis that successful assassinations are less likely
when sticky bombs are used compared to other types of explosives. Interestingly, Freilich and
Mandala (2017a) do not find sticky bombs to be significantly associated with assassinations.
However, this may be because Mandala and Freilich (2017a) utilized a substantially smaller
sample size than the sample size used in this study. Like the firearms finding, this result aligns
with Clarke and Newman’s weapons opportunity pillar and assertions regarding terrorist weapon
selection (MURDEROUS). As noted, sticky bombs are a more complicated weapon compared to
other types of explosives, as well as firearms. While sticky bombs are less likely to be detected
than other explosives due to their small size, they require more skill and thus more effort to
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build. In addition to the skill required to build a sticky bomb, terrorists must be able to locate the
target’s vehicle, attach the bomb without raising suspicion, and detonate the bomb on time.
Terrorists must therefore exert a lot of effort to successfully carry out an assassination
using a sticky bomb. This is confirmed by the open source materials, which reveal several events
where the sticky bomb did not detonate on time, thereby missing the target and reducing the
terrorists’ rewards. Other cases demonstrate how alert security personnel successfully detected
sticky bombs on vehicles to reduce the terrorists’ rewards. These results are supportive of
research that finds that terrorists opt for weapons, targets, and attack plans that are less
complicated over those that are more complex. In their study of lone-actors, Gill and Corner
(2016) explain that these terrorists must operate under various technical, financial, and practical
constraints. As a result, lone-actors often have to re-assess their plans and abandon those that are
more complicated in favor of simpler plots (Gill & Corner, 2016).
Overall, these weapons findings suggest that counterterrorism measures should focus on
firearms to adequately prevent against successful assassinations and safeguard vulnerable targets.
Metal detectors at entry and exit points can help increase the risks involved for terrorists, as they
increase their likelihood of being detected and captured. Strategically placed security
checkpoints along with electronic surveillance can also help increase the risks involved for
terrorists. Installing bullet-resistant windows and doors on motor vehicles can make it more
difficult for terrorists to murder their target. Additionally, firearms tracking systems and
registration requirements can potentially help increase the effort for terrorists in obtaining
firearms. Bulletproof vests for targets, along with armed guards, are more target-hardening
measures that can effectively reduce terrorists’ rewards. Lastly, arming the target is one
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protection measure that can effectively protect the target and ultimately reduce the rewards for
terrorists.
The open source materials highlight how many of these measures effectively protect
targets from assassinations involving firearms. In particular, there are several examples of armed
targets returning fire and protecting themselves during unsuccessful assassination events. In
many of these cases, the target successfully kills or injures the terrorists. As discussed, there are
numerous examples of officials using security checkpoints to detect terrorists attempting to
approach their targets and ultimately disrupting attacks. Several unsuccessful assassination cases
further demonstrate the importance of bulletproof vehicles in not only protecting targets from
death, but also from sustaining any injuries.

Targets
The full model supports many of the target related hypotheses. When the target is at work
or at home, the assassination is less likely to be successful compared to when the target is outside
a physical building or structure during the attack. When a target is in a motor vehicle, the attack
is less likely to be successful compared to when they are located outside a physical building or
structure. Lastly, successful assassinations are less likely when a target is travelling in a
motorcade compared to when no motorcade is in place. These findings both partly contradict as
well as align with Mandala and Freilich’s (2017a) study. Mandala and Freilich (2017a) find that
successful assassinations are not related to whether or not the target is attacked at their place of
work. They also do not find motorcades to be significantly associated with successful attacks.
However, they do find successful assassinations to be less likely when the target is located in a
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motor vehicle, rather than outside, during an attack. As noted earlier, Mandala and Freilich’s
(2017a) small sample size may account for the differences in results.
These results indicate that targets are more likely to have security and other capable
guardians at their places of work and at their residences compared to when they are located
outside of buildings or structures. More effort is required of terrorists to successfully attack
targets at these locations that have protection measures in place, and there is an increased risk for
terrorists to be detected by security. Thus, vulnerable targets should limit the time they spend
outside, especially among crowds, without protection since less effort is required of terrorists to
carry out an attack outside compared to inside a physical building or structure. Various
protection measures can be implemented to fortify buildings where targets may work or reside.
For example, barriers and fences can be strategically installed in front of such buildings to
increase the effort for terrorists to approach the target.
A motor vehicle offers another form of protection and has the advantage of being mobile,
so it can assist the target in outmaneuvering the terrorists and evading an attack (i.e., speeding,
swerving). If the vehicle is reinforced with bullet-resistant doors and windows, then it can further
serve to increase the effort required of terrorists and reduce their rewards by inhibiting their
ability to successfully attack the target. A motorcade is an additional protection measure that
targets can utilize when travelling by motor vehicle. Motorcades usually have security personnel
and other capable guardians present, increasing the risks involved for terrorists since the
opportunities to successfully attack the target are more limited. The fact that motorcades are
often made up of several vehicles can make it difficult for terrorists to determine which vehicle
to attack, thereby reducing their rewards if they attack the wrong car where the target is not
inside. The motorcade essentially adds a step to the script of the attack, as terrorists have to not

105

only determine the precise vehicle the target is in, but also figure this out in a relatively short
time span.
The open source articles provide many examples of effective measures involving motor
vehicles that protect the target. In one unsuccessful assassination, the location of the target in the
vehicle proved to be a key protective factor. In particular, because the target was seated in the
middle of the vehicle when attacked, the target was able to escape the unharmed. There are
multiple examples of unsuccessful attacks involving bullet-proof vehicles, suggesting that these
vehicles can effectively reduce the terrorists’ rewards. The open sources further support the
effectiveness of targets travelling in both bullet-proof vehicles and motorcades. Some
unsuccessful cases also cite the role of motorcades in confusing the terrorists and causing them
to attack the wrong vehicle. Numerous unsuccessful cases credit the skill and alertness of the
driver as being an important factor in protecting the target. In one case, the driver maneuvered
the vehicle away from the attack to safety despite being fired on. In another example, an alert
driver was credited for saving the target by recognizing that terrorists were attempting to stop the
vehicle. An attentive driver was again credited for saving the target when the terrorists attempted
to stop the vehicle. The resourceful driver initially stopped the car, but then sped up and fled
away when the terrorists advanced towards the vehicle.
Relatedly, several successful assassinations indicate that drivers should be especially alert
and avoid stopping the vehicle when possible. Numerous successful cases involve the terrorists
shooting and killing the target when their car either stops or slows down. In one example, the
target was killed when he slowed down at a speed bump, and another involved the target being
was killed when he slowed his car down at an intersection. In one incident, the target was
attacked and killed when he stopped his car at a roundabout. These examples illustrate how

106

everyday traffic conditions (i.e., speed bumps, intersections, and roundabouts) can create
opportunities for successful assassinations. While these are not necessarily conditions that can be
easily avoided, skilled drivers can assist targets in escaping injury or death by recognizing
opportunities for attacks and by employing evasive tactics to maneuver the vehicle to safety.
These cases underscore the need for drivers to be adequately trained to respond to an attack.
Similar to how security and police personnel participate in scenario-based trainings for terrorist
attacks and mass-casualty events, such as active shooter incidents, drivers could also partake in
these types of trainings. In particular, scenario-based trainings could incorporate actors to portray
both terrorists and bystanders to mimic real world situations. These trainings would have the
benefit of allowing drivers to practice effective driving tactics for evading terrorists during an
assassination attack. Drivers could also receive certifications for successfully completing this
training, which would benefit vulnerable targets as they could ensure whether or not their drivers
have been trained.

Terrorists
As predicted, when terrorists attack from a motorcycle, assassinations are more likely to
occur compared to when they attack from outside a physical building or structure. This finding is
supportive of Clarke and Newman’s (2006) tools opportunity pillar, a key construct in their four
pillars of terrorist opportunity that has rarely, if ever, been tested. In fact, this dissertation
represents one of the first studies to empirically test this pillar of opportunity. This study also
extends Mandala and Freilich’s (2017a) analysis, which did not include terrorist use of
motorcycles or motor vehicles. The incorporation of the tools opportunity pillar thus represents
another unique contribution that this study is making to the literature. A motorcycle essentially
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represents a tool that can assist terrorists in successfully assassinating their target. In particular, a
motorcycle can help terrorists approach their target relatively easily since motorcycles are
smaller and more maneuverable than a vehicle. These characteristics can enable terrorists to
swiftly navigate through traffic and escape the scene of the attack, reducing their risks and
ultimately increasing their rewards. These features may further explain why the model does not
find successful assassinations to be associated with terrorists using motor vehicles. Since
motorcycles allow terrorists to attack while mobile, they can similarly assist terrorists in
attacking targets that are mobile (i.e., in a motor vehicle or motorcycle). At the same time,
motorcycles enable terrorists to attack stationary targets (i.e., targets located outside of buildings
or structures).
Various measures can be used to protect against successful assassinations involving
terrorists on motorcycles. Many of these measures are similarly applicable to attacks involving
terrorists in motor vehicles. For example, strategically placed road barriers and street closures
can impede terrorists using either motor vehicles or motorcycles from successfully approaching
their targets. Placing limitations on and controlling access routes can further serve to limit the
target’s exposure to terrorists travelling via motorcycle or motor vehicle. Traffic restrictions can
be used as a protection measure when implemented in areas that are particularly susceptible to
attacks.
Additional measures to protect against assassinations by terrorists on motorcycles are
illustrated in the open source materials. As a result of so many attacks being carried out by
perpetrators on motorcycles, the police in one unsuccessful case were cited as instituting a ban
on motorcycle travel at night. While this type of ban may not be feasible in all jurisdictions,
authorities could consider implementing a motorcycle ban on days or locations where a
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vulnerable target is traveling. Other unsuccessful cases illustrate how motorcycles can be used as
tools by terrorists in ways other than facilitating travel. For example, in one unsuccessful attack,
a bomb was attached to a motorcycle that had a fake license plate and had been reported stolen
the previous month. Other cases similarly note how terrorists frequently use vehicles without
license plates. These cases are indicative of how traditional crime (i.e., auto-theft) can be
connected to terrorist activity. They further demonstrate how the lack of a license plate is a
warning sign that law enforcement, as well as the general public, should be wary of. In fact,
many successful assassinations involved terrorists using stolen vehicles/motorcycles along with
vehicles/motorcycles without license plates. These issues are reminiscent of the first World
Trade Center bombing in 1993. Following the 1993 attacks, the FBI identified a piece of a truck
that belonged to a rental van that had been reported stolen the previous day by a terrorist
involved in the attack, Mohammed Salameh. Salameh reportedly called the rental office
repeatedly to get his $400 deposit back, and this information proved integral in helping the
authorities with their investigation (9/11 Commission, 2004). This is further illustrated by the
1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Following the bombing, Timothy McVeigh was captured when
an Oklahoma Highway Patrol trooper pulled him over for not having a license plate on his car
(Branson-Potts, 2015).

Attack Intensity
In contrast to what was hypothesized, the full model finds that when higher numbers of
victims are struck (i.e., injuries and fatalities), successful assassinations are less likely to occur
compared to when lower numbers of victims are struck. While this finding appears to contradict
the SCP notion that terrorists seek to obtain high casualties in attacks, it could speak to how the
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tactic of assassination is unique compared to other types of terrorist attacks. Specifically,
assassinations target specific individuals, rather than groups of people. This result could
therefore indicate that successful attacks result in fewer injuries and deaths as a direct result of
terrorists seeking to murder specific individuals rather than groups of people. In support of what
was predicted, when higher numbers of collateral deaths (i.e., deaths other than the target or
terrorists) occur, attacks are more likely to be successful compared to when lower numbers of
collateral deaths take place. While this finding appears somewhat contradictory of the previous
result regarding victims struck, it could be indicative of bystanders and/or family members being
near the target during the attack. It may also suggest that terrorists seek to eliminate any potential
guardians close to the target that could disrupt the assassination.
These results speak to the need to implement protection measures that reduce terrorists’
rewards. For example, terrorists’ rewards can be reduced by authorities rapidly cleaning up the
scene of an assassination. Cleaning up the scene in the immediate aftermath of an attack reduces
terrorist rewards by limiting their ability to incorporate the images of the destruction into their
propaganda materials (Clarke & Newman, 2006). To prevent against collateral deaths, authorities
should limit the proximity of bystanders to vulnerable targets. For example, if there is a
substantiated threat against a politician or government official, those individuals should limit
their contact with members of the public, especially when outside and in open spaces. Increased
security measures at events where vulnerable targets are located can also serve to reduce rewards
for terrorists. One measure could be to limit the types of bags people are allowed to bring into
event locations. This type of restriction was recently implement by the National Football League
(NFL) in June 2013 for all of its stadiums3. As part of this policy, fans are only allowed to have
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clear bags no larger than 12” x 6” x 12”. This type of measure protects the target from an
assassination as well as bystanders that could be injured or killed during an attack.
The open source materials for both successful and unsuccessful assassinations help
explain the results regarding victims struck and collateral deaths, as well as provide examples of
how authorities can attempt to limit the intensity of an attack. There are several unsuccessful
assassination incidents where either roadside bombs or sticky bombs explode too late or too
early, thus missing the target but harming bystanders. These mistimed explosions may therefore
partly account for why successful assassinations are negatively associated with the total number
of victims struck. Interestingly, some of the unsuccessful cases noted the role of responding
security officials in creating additional injuries and fatalities. In multiple incidents, security
personnel were specifically blamed for firing indiscriminately at crowds of civilians when they
responded to the terrorists, ultimately adding to the casualties and injuries at the scene of the
attack.
Both successful and unsuccessful cases have extensive examples of terrorists creatively
hiding their weapons. A few cases involve bombs hidden under trash piles, while the bombers in
some suicide attacks hid their explosives inside their turbans. In one case, a bomb was planted in
the target’s shoe while he was praying at a mosque. These events illustrate the need for
vulnerable targets and security personnel to be alert and mindful of the innovative ways terrorists
alter their tactics. One open source specifically highlights how Boko Haram constantly changes
its tactics and attacks the least expected places. In several successful and unsuccessful
assassination cases, the terrorists disguised themselves to evade security and appear nonthreatening. In a few cases the attackers dressed in burqas and women’s clothing. Several
incidents note how the terrorists disguised themselves as security, police, or military personnel
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by wearing their respective uniforms. Given the frequency with which terrorists choose to don
military and police uniforms to disguise themselves, efforts should be taken by these
organizations to limit the sale of official uniforms to non-members of the service. For example,
proper identification should be required to purchase these uniforms, and limitations should be
placed on where they are sold (i.e., they should only be sold by the respective military or police
agency and not by any third party). Other cases illustrate how terrorists use disguise to fit in at
the attack location. In one incident, the gunman disguised himself in a school uniform and
successfully killed the headmaster of the school. Another gunman disguised himself as a mason
to successfully assassinate his target. In one case, several terrorists wore municipal employees’
uniforms to facilitate their attack.
Numerous successful and unsuccessful assassinations also involved either current or
former police personnel carrying out the attack. In one case, all 6 of the terrorists involved were
on the police force, while another event was perpetrated by a former police officer. In one
successful attack, the target was killed by his own bodyguard. In another case, the target’s guard
led him into a separate room in his residence, away from any capable guardians, and shot and
killed him. These cases are reminiscent of the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi, who was killed by her own security guard. More recently, in December 2016, the
Russian ambassador to Turkey was assassinated by an off-duty police officer at an art exhibit in
Ankara. These cases show that security personnel represent unique risks since they not only have
easy access to targets, but also to weapons. In addition, because they typically represent
individuals that are trusted by targets, they can more easily plan and carry out an attack without
raising suspicion. These incidents further demonstrate the need for periodic background checks
to be applied to security personnel, especially those who work in close proximity to the target.
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As the above examples all demonstrate, an awareness of how terrorists continue to evolve in
their activities and tactics will help authorities detect suspicious activity and intervene to reduce
terrorist rewards.

Distance
Similar to Mandala and Freilich’s (2017a) study, when terrorists are in close proximity to
their targets (i.e., point-blank range), successful assassinations are more likely to occur compared
to when they are not in close proximity. This result demonstrates support for the SCP literature
that explores how terrorists select their targets and prepare for attacks. In particular, it aligns with
the “near” element in Clarke and Newman’s (2006) EVIL DONE target selection acronym.
Clarke and Newman (2006) even argue that this is the most important factor when terrorists
select their targets. This result also supports Clarke and Newman’s (2005) target opportunity
pillar. Although more effort is required of terrorists to get close to their targets, especially those
targets that are well protected, they are more likely to successfully kill the target when in close
proximity. Terrorist rewards are increased, as are target opportunities, when terrorists are able to
get near their targets.
Various measures can be directed towards preventing terrorists from getting in close
proximity to their targets. As previously mentioned, vulnerable targets should limit their
exposure to crowds and reduce their time spent outside without security personnel. When there
are substantiated threats against any particular government officials, such as presidents or prime
ministers, those individuals should especially consider limiting their interaction with the public.
For example, the assassination of former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has been
attributed to the fact that the public was allowed so close to Bhutto. Security checkpoints, road
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closures, and barriers around locations where targets live or work can assist authorities in
controlling public access to targets. Vulnerable targets should also regularly alter their daily
routines to and from work and/or home to evade terrorists attempting to track their routines and
travel patterns. When terrorists cannot become familiar with a target’s travel patterns, more
effort is required for them to determine where and when they should attack.
Examples illustrating the importance of targets altering their daily routines are seen in the
open source materials. In one successful assassination incident, the materials note how the
terrorists had complete information about the target’s routine and the route he would take for
dropping off his children before work. In a few other cases, the terrorists attacked when they
knew the target’s security guards were not present. Terrorists clearly attempt to familiarize
themselves with the daily routines of their targets. To further limit proximity to terrorists,
vulnerable targets should be wary of strangers who seek to confirm their identity, as this could be
a sign that the individual requesting this confirmation is a terrorist. As noted in several of the
successful assassination cases, terrorists often ask their targets for their identity and then attack
as soon as the target confirms who they are. To reduce terrorist rewards, vulnerable targets
should not confirm their identity when requested to by strangers who approach them on the street
or elsewhere.

Control Variables & Insignificant Variables
Regarding the significant control variables, the results from the full model are largely
reflective of the findings by Mandala and Freilich (2017a), in that successful assassinations are
associated with the year and day of the week control variables. However, Mandala and Freilich
(2017a) find successful assassinations to be less likely to occur on a Tuesday compared to a
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Sunday, while this model instead finds that successful assassinations are more likely to occur on
a Tuesday compared to a Sunday. This finding is interesting considering how research has
typically found that crime occurs more often on the weekend compared to other days of the
week. The fact that this model finds successful assassinations to be less likely in recent years is
also interesting considering how there has been an increase in total assassinations taking place
worldwide from 2005-2014 (Mandala, 2016). Thus, while assassinations overall are increasing
during this time period, successful assassinations are occurring less often. Perhaps this is
indicative of prevention and protection measures becoming more effective at disrupting
successful attacks in recent years.
Several variables are insignificant in the full model. In particular, the target type
hypothesis is not supported. This contradicts Mandala and Freilich (2017b), who find successful
assassinations to be significantly less likely to involve official government targets compared to
unofficial targets. At the same time, target type is insignificant in a separate study by Mandala
and Freilich (2017a). For the terrorist location variable, terrorists in motor vehicle and terrorists
inside a building or structure are insignificant. This is interesting considering that target in motor
vehicle is significant. This illustrates that the target location and terrorist location variables are
not highly related to each other. With regards to the other target location categories, target on
motorcycle and target inside are insignificant. This contrasts the finding by Mandala and Freilich
(2017a), who find successful assassinations to be less likely when the target is inside rather than
outside during an attack. With regards to the weapon type hypotheses, suicide attacks are not
significantly related to successful assassinations, which also contradicts Mandala and Freilich
(2017b), who find successful assassinations to be less likely when a suicide attack is involved.
Considering how the SCP literature finds suicide terrorism to be more deadly and effective in
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reaching targets than non-suicide terrorism, this finding is surprising. The use of multiple
weapons types and other weapon types are also insignificant. The remaining hypotheses
regarding capable guardians are not supported (security is present but does not respond; family
around; bystanders around; family and bystanders around). Lastly, the control variables for
multiple terrorists, capital city, season, and the remaining day of the week categories are
insignificant.

Regional Models
In general, the regional models contain many of the same significant variables as the full
model. However, these models also contain some differences. This suggests that while SCP
exerts an influence on successful assassinations in all regions, some factors are uniquely
associated with certain regions and not others. This further supports the need to be as specific as
possible when examining different forms of crime and terrorism. Clarke (1995) has long argued
that the opportunity structures for robbery, for example, may well vary by location and time. In
line with that and what Clarke and Newman (2006) maintain, assassinations in the Middle East
may vary compared to assassinations occurring in Sub Saharan Africa. Thus, a regional analysis
of assassinations by terrorists can be informative for obtaining a more comprehensive
understanding of the tactic.
The regions analyzed in this study contain the countries cited in the GTD codebook
(National Consortium, 2016). The Middle East & North Africa model contains assassinations
that occurred in the following 22 countries during the time period of 2005-2014: Algeria,
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Yemen,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank
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and Gaza Strip, Western Sahara, and Yemen. The South Asia region analyzes attacks that
occurred in the following 9 countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives,
Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The Southeast Asia model examines the following 12
countries: Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Vietnam. Lastly, the 49 countries included in the Sub
Saharan Africa model include: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea‐Bissau, Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia,
Niger, Nigeria, People's Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Rhodesia, Rwanda,
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Due to small sample sizes, individual models could only be conducted for these 4
regions. To further tease out how SCP influences different regions, future research can utilize
larger sample sizes for these same regions as well as analyze a larger sample of assassinations in
other regions, such as Eastern Europe, South America, etc.

Middle East & North Africa
The model for the Middle East & North Africa reveals several similarities with the full
regression model. In fact, it contains all of the same significant variables, with a few exceptions.
In the full model, successful assassinations are less likely when the target is at work when
attacked. However, this hypothesis is no longer significant in the Middle East & North Africa
model. Perhaps this finding differs from the main model because targets in the Middle East are
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attacked more often at locations other than work. In addition, workplace assassinations in the
region may require more effort on the part of terrorists to carry out if there is heightened security
in place at these locations.
The results for the Middle East & North Africa further differ from the main model in that
successful assassinations are significantly more likely when suicide bombs are used compared to
other types of explosives. Interestingly, this is the only model that supports this hypothesis, and it
contrasts Mandala and Freilich (2017b), who actually find successful assassinations in all regions
to be negatively associated with suicide attacks. This difference may be explained by the fact that
Mandala and Freilich (2017b) examined a much longer time period (1970-2014) than the time
period analyzed in this study (2005-2014). Perhaps suicide attacks are positively associated with
successful assassinations in the Middle East and North Africa because terrorists utilize suicide
attacks more often in this region compared to terrorists in other regions. As noted previously,
suicide attacks reduce the risks involved for terrorists since they do not have to consider an exit
plan. Since research also finds suicide attacks to be particularly effective at murdering targets,
these types of attacks thus increase the rewards involved for terrorists.
The last difference unique to the Middle East & North Africa model is the finding that
when family of the target, as well as bystanders, are present during an attack, then a successful
assassination is less likely to take place compared to when no one else is present. This result
shows that family and bystanders in the Middle East & North Africa serve as effective capable
guardians that can prevent against successful assassinations. These individuals can help to detect
and report suspicious activity or bombs, as well as help shield and protect the target when
attacked. As discussed in some of the open source materials, these individuals can also
potentially respond and fight back against the terrorists during an attack.
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The open source materials illustrate the determination of terrorists to avoid detection. For
example, one attack involved a suicide bomber in a wheelchair. In another case, a female suicide
bomber used a police ID to get admitted into an event where the target was located, successfully
evading detection by security. Several suicide attacks are successful due to weak or ineffective
security. In one case, security did not check a female who ultimately turned out to be the suicide
bomber. In another, the target asked security not to frisk anyone, resulting in the bomber easily
approaching and embracing the target. In one assassination, it was discovered that because the
suicide bomber was over 50, he was able to approach the target unnoticed. One successful
suicide attack was reportedly carried out by the target’s niece. Other examples demonstrate the
easy access that some suicide bombers have to their targets. Several successful incidents involve
the suicide bomber simply walking up and embracing the target prior to detonating. In one case,
the bomber walked into the target’s office pretending to be looking for work, and then detonated.
In another attack, the bomber was among the guests at a wedding that the target was attending.
These cases all illustrate the importance of performing regular security checks on individuals that
do not appear threatening or suspicious. Terrorists clearly make efforts to disguise themselves to
fit in at the locations where they attack.
To prevent opportunities for successful assassinations, especially in the Middle East
where suicide attacks are more prevalent, security must remain vigilant at all times to detect both
potential bombers and environmental conditions that may make it easier for terrorists to
approach their target. One successful case in particular illustrates this point. During this attack,
the target’s vehicle was parked next to a fruit vendor’s stall. The open sources note that a narrow
corridor formed between the target’s vehicle and the fruit stall, which people had been passing
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through. It was this corridor that the suicide bomber used to approach and successfully kill the
target.
The open sources also demonstrate how capable guardians, in the form of bystanders and
family of the target, can intervene during attacks and prevent successful assassinations. In
numerous unsuccessful attacks, alert civilians have been credited for detecting suspicious
behavior as well as bombs. In one particular unsuccessful assassination, community members
intervened and stopped gunmen who were firing on a tribal leader’s home. Other cases involve
residents spotting a bomb outside of a target’s residence and alerting the police who then defuse
it. One attack was unsuccessful as a result of a civilian bystander intervening and saving a group
of diplomats under attack. Family members can also effectively retaliate against attackers. In one
example, the target’s son returned fire and was able to kill one of the terrorists. As these
incidents show, family members and bystanders can effectively disrupt and prevent successful
assassinations. The fact that this finding is only significant for the Middle East & North Africa
model may indicate that it is more difficult for terrorists in this region to carry out an attack when
the target is isolated.

South Asia
The South Asia model contains all of the same significant variables as the full model,
with a few differences. As noted previously, due to the regional models containing smaller
sample sizes than the full model, categories for some variables had to be collapsed. For the South
Asia model, the target location categories of target in motor vehicle and target in motorcycle
were combined. This resulting category is significant, and successful assassinations are
negatively associated with the target being in a motor vehicle or motorcycle. By comparison, the
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full model finds the target in motor vehicle category to be significantly and negatively associated
with successful assassinations, but the target in motorcycle category is insignificant. Since these
categories are combined in the South Asia model, it is not possible to distinguish between the
influence of the target in motor vehicle and target in motorcycle categories. Another difference
between the South Asia and full model is that the main model finds the target at home hypothesis
to be significant, while this hypothesis is no longer supported in the South Asia model. This may
be a result of targets in South Asia being more vulnerable at locations other than their residences.
Thus, perhaps more opportunities for successful assassinations exist for terrorists at other
locations. In contrast to the full model, sticky bombs are no longer significant in the South Asia
model. The literature suggests that sticky bombs are more prevalent in the Middle East than
elsewhere. Thus, perhaps sticky bombs are insignificant in this model because they are not
utilized as often in South Asia compared to other regions like the Middle East.
Interestingly, while firearms remain significantly associated with successful
assassinations, two additional weapon type categories are likewise significantly associated with
successful attacks in South Asia. In particular, successful assassinations are positively related to
weapon types other than firearms and explosives, as well as the use of multiple types. These
findings are unique to the South Asia model, as they remain insignificant in all other models.
Since the other weapon type category contains all weapons other than explosives, sticky bombs,
and firearms, this result could indicate that other types of weapons that are less complex, like
knives, are more prevalent in South Asia than other regions. This would support elements of the
MURDEROUS acronym for weapon selection (Clarke & Newman, 2006), as knives are easier to
acquire, easily concealable, and easier to use compared to other more sophisticated weapons like
explosives and firearms. The use of simpler weapon types, like knives, therefore reduce the
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effort and risks involved for terrorists. If less complex weapon types are used by terrorists in
South Asia, then perhaps that is why successful assassinations are also significantly more likely
to occur when terrorists use multiple weapon types. While simpler and less complex weapons
may be easier for terrorists to use and acquire, they may also be less effective when used alone,
and thus multiple weapon types may need to be used simultaneously by terrorists for the attack to
be successful.
Overall, these findings suggest that prevention measures in South Asia need to be focused
on all weapon types that can be utilized in an assassination, and not just firearms and explosives.
Anecdotally, the open source materials suggest that the use of knives are more prevalent in South
Asia, as well as Southeast Asia, compared to other regions like the Middle East and Sub Saharan
Africa. This further highlights the need for target hardening measures and the need for
vulnerable targets to avoid crowded areas where terrorists can more easily approach and attack
them.

Southeast Asia
The Southeast Asia model contains substantially fewer significant variables than the main
model, but it does contain some similarities. Specifically, the close proximity, collateral deaths,
and firearms hypotheses remain supported in this model. Interestingly, the victims struck,
terrorist location, target location, and remaining weapon type hypotheses are all insignificant. It
is worth noting that some of these differences may be attributable to the small sample size that
characterizes this model (n = 147). The Southeast Asia model does contain a new and unique
significant finding compared to the other models: successful assassinations are less likely to take
place when security is present at the scene of the attack, but does not engage the terrorists,
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compared to when no security is present. This result demonstrates support for the idea of capable
guardianship in the form of security guards or law enforcement protecting the target. This is also
interesting considering how the main model only finds security response to have a significant
impact on reducing successful assassinations, and the presence of security that does not respond
is insignificant. In contrast to the main model, it appears that the presence of security alone has a
deterrent effect on successful attacks in Southeast Asia. Thus, terrorists in this region may
believe there is too much effort or risk involved if they see that a target is protected by security.
While security personnel in this region still need to be sufficiently trained to effectively respond
to terrorists, these results may indicate that security personnel do not get a chance to respond
when attacked. For example, perhaps terrorists in Southeast Asia do not spend as much time at
the scene of the attack as terrorists in other regions do. If they notice security personnel near the
target, then the terrorists may be concerned with fleeing the scene as fast as possible to avoid
capture, thereby limiting the ability of security personnel on site to respond while simultaneously
limiting the likelihood of the assassination being successful.

Sub Saharan Africa
Like the Southeast Asia model, the results from the Sub Saharan Africa analysis contain
fewer significant variables than the main model, while also supporting some similar hypotheses.
This model finds a few additional hypotheses to be supported compared to the Southeast Asia
model, while also having the smallest sample size of all the regional analyses (n = 134). Like the
full model, the hypotheses for close proximity, victims struck, collateral deaths, firearms, and
target motorcade remain supported in the Sub Saharan Africa model. As discussed previously,
due to low counts in the target location categories for this model, the target inside category is
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inclusive of the target being located at home or at work. This model thus finds that successful
assassinations are less likely when the target is inside a physical building or structure during an
attack compared to if they are located outside. However, due to the categories being condensed,
it is not clear how to differentiate the impact of the target being located at home, work, or inside
buildings other than these locations.
Unlike the main model, an additional hypothesis is supported that is unique to the Sub
Saharan Africa analysis. This model finds that contrary to what was hypothesized, successful
assassinations are more likely to occur when security is present but does not respond compared
to when no security is present at the scene of the attack. This result also contradicts the Southeast
Asia model, which instead finds that the presence of security is significantly and negatively
related to successful assassinations. This finding may indicate that assassinations that occur in
Sub Saharan Africa are more chaotic than attacks that occur in Southeast Asia or other regions.
Thus, when security is present but does not respond to the terrorists, perhaps they are unable to
effectively return fire because they cannot determine where the terrorists are attacking from.
Terrorist rewards are therefore increased when they can successfully inflict confusion at the
scene of the attack to evade an effective security response and murder the target. As the open
sources discuss, there are several examples of successful assassinations occurring as a result of
terrorists creating confusion at the scene of the attack by using methods to isolate the target and
their entourages, such as road closures. In one successful case, the terrorists effectively blocked
the road that the target was travelling on with a tree trunk. Other successful attacks involve the
terrorists blocking the road with their cars, enabling them to successfully gun down the target.
Opportunities for terrorists to create confusion through the implementation of road closures
illustrate the need for targets to frequently alter their daily routines, so terrorists will not be able
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to become familiar with or predict which roads or routes that the target will use on any given
day. Lastly, as previously detailed, this result demonstrates the need for security personnel to be
sufficiently trained to respond to terrorists during attacks. Unlike the Southeast Asia model but
similar to the full model and the other regional analyses, security personnel that are present but
do not engage the terrorists are largely ineffective at disrupting successful assassinations. This
highlights the need for detailed case studies and script analyses to further unravel and better
understand these differences.

CH. 8: LIMITATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, & FUTURE RESEARCH

Limitations
Since the data utilized in this study are derived from open sources, some limitations are
present. Assassination cases included in the GTD, as well as in the additional media outlets
consulted, are more likely to account for incidents that occur in Western countries (LaFree et al.,
2015). Attacks that occur in autocratic countries, like North Korea or Russia, are most likely to
be excluded from the GTD since the Western media has limited access to information on these
countries (LaFree et al., 2015). The GTD may also include inaccuracies that are reported by the
media, as well as lack detailed information on all attacks (LaFree et al., 2015). The GTD does
not contain incidents that are unknown to the media, such as those that are disrupted or prevented
by authorities. The GTD has been criticized for excluding state sponsored incidents of terrorism
(LaFree et al., 2015). Coding errors represent another limitation with the GTD. For example, as
the coding for SCP variables progressed in this study, a total of 37 cases were discovered to be
incorrectly coded. Most of these coding errors related to the “success” variable, in that cases
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were coded as unsuccessful when they were actually successful, and vice versa. While these
errors do represent a limitation when relying on GTD data, they were easily reversed when they
were discovered. In addition, of all 2,000 assassination cases examined, there were very few
detected that suffered from these coding errors. Despite these critiques, the GTD still represents
the most comprehensive and unclassified database on terrorism that exists (LaFree et al., 2015),
and thus will continue to remain a valuable resource for assassination research.
Overall, the main limitation of this research relates to the open source materials that were
used to code for the new SCP specific variables. First, media reports for some of the incidents
could not be found, so the SCP variables had to be coded based on the narrative variable
provided in the GTD. The media reports of the assassination incidents also vary in terms of the
detail provided. This ultimately resulted in some variables having to be excluded from the
analyses altogether (i.e., the time of day control variable). This is a familiar limitation found in
many studies that use open source materials (Meloy & Amman, 2016; Mandala & Freilich,
2017a). For example, Meloy and Amman (2016) describe these issues in their study of public
figure attacks using open source materials. Specifically, they explain how their sample is limited
by not containing incidents that the media did not report.
Additionally, the level of detail provided by the open sources varied across incidents
(Meloy & Amman, 2016). Because the media reports on assassinations that were used for this
study provided varying levels of detail, some assassination cases were very detailed while others
had scant information available. This resulted in some variables containing missing values,
thereby reducing the total sample size that could be analyzed in the full model. Sample size
represents a potential limitation for the individual regional models, especially for the two regions
with the smallest samples sizes (Southeast Asia and Sub Saharan Africa). Future research can
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therefore utilize larger sample sizes for the region-specific analyses. While the open sources for
each of the four regions appeared consistent in the level of detail provided, the sources for the
Middle East & North Africa incidents tended to offer more detail compared to the incidents
occurring in the other three regions. This could be a result of the Middle East & North Africa
experiencing the greatest proportion of attacks, as well as the fact that the region gets much
coverage by the international media due to its experience with terrorism. Not surprisingly, it was
also observed that the incident detail provided by the open sources were more limited in the
earlier years, specifically in the years prior to 2008. Finally, the results from the analyses
conducted in this study are only applicable for the years examined (2005-2014). As a result,
conclusions cannot be made from these findings about successful assassinations taking place
during other time periods.

Contributions to Literature, Research and Policy
This research investigates the value of the environmental criminology and SCP
approaches in understanding the opportunities that facilitate successful terrorist assassinations as
well as assisting the development of counterterrorism measures directed towards assassinations.
Policy makers and law enforcement practitioners can apply this framework to obtain a
comprehensive understanding of what type of environment enables the occurrence of successful
assassinations, and thus better allocate their counterterrorism resources. Successful attacks can
be prevented or disrupted through the implementation of various measures developed from SCP.
In addition to assisting policy makers and practitioners, this study contributes to the terrorism
and criminology literature by applying SCP and environmental criminology to a topic that has
been rarely explored by criminologists: terrorist assassinations. Since most of the assassination
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literature remains in fields outside of criminology, and because most assassination studies have
examined case studies, this dissertation contributes to the current assassination literature by using
a quantitative approach to examine a large number of incidents spanning several years. The
incorporation of additional SCP variables to the GTD enables a better operationalization of key
SCP constructs, thus providing a fuller and more refined test of the framework. Additionally,
since the existing assassination literature tends to focus on the individual assassin and their
motivations, this study demonstrates how SCP can broaden our understanding of terrorism by
focusing on the assassination event and the situations that enable successful attacks.
By utilizing an innovative approach to develop new data, this study has important
implications for future research on not only terrorism and assassinations, but for other terrorist
tactics as well. The data and variables developed for this study can be further expanded and
refined to analyze other attack types or more specific types of assassinations (i.e., assassinations
of religious leaders). As noted earlier, research can expand off of this dissertation’s regional
analyses to incorporate larger sample sizes for the regions that had fewer assassinations than
others, like Sub-Saharan Africa. Expanding the sample sizes for these regions could potentially
overcome the issue discussed previously regarding coverage bias in the open sources. In the
process of conducting more refined regional tests, future studies may reveal that additional SCP
variables or categories should be incorporated into the current dataset. For example, it may be
discovered that “knives” should be added as a weapon type category. Thus, the dataset developed
in this dissertation can evolve as the research on SCP and terrorism continues to grow.
Although this study focuses on terrorist assassinations instead of assassinations
committed by individuals not classified as terrorists, future research can explore the situational
context in which non-terrorist assassinations occur. Doing so would allow researchers to
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determine whether or not SCP factors have different effects on non-terrorist assassinations
compared to terrorist assassinations as well as any possible diffusion or displacement effects.
Since this study mainly applies routine activities and rational choice theory, future research can
focus on crime pattern theory by applying spatial analyses to assassinations. This approach will
help inform policy makers and practitioners with regards to the geographic and temporal patterns
of assassinations. Researchers can expand off of this study by applying a similar approach of
integrating open source materials to test other criminological frameworks, such as strain theory
or social learning theory, to examine terrorist assassinations. Research can further extend this
study by disaggregating assassinations, such as by target type or weapon type, to analyze even
more specific forms of the tactic, as recommended by the SCP literature. Similarly, research can
analyze other types of terrorist attacks, like kidnappings and suicide attacks, to determine
whether or not the success of such tactics are influenced by similar or different SCP variables
when compared to assassinations. As Clarke and Newman (2006) maintain, specificity is
important in developing the most effective prevention measures. Thus, examining specific forms
of assassinations can assist the development of even more tailored and effective prevention
measures. It is thus evident that this study has the potential to not only inform counterterrorism
practice and policy, but to also contribute to the assassination, terrorism, and criminology
research literature.

CONCLUSION
This dissertation applies a criminological lens to the study of terrorist assassinations. In
particular, the SCP and environmental criminology frameworks are used to quantitatively
analyze a random sample of roughly 1,000 successful and 1,000 unsuccessful terrorist
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assassination events taking place between 2005 and 2014. The GTD, as well as additional opensource material, are used to analyze SCP specific variables through a binary logistic regression.
The results from this study reflect how valuable environmental criminology and SCP can be in
informing prevention measures directed towards disrupting successful terrorist assassinations.
To summarize, the full regression model finds that successful assassinations are less
likely when: security is present and responds to terrorists; sticky bombs are used; the target is in
a motor vehicle when attacked; the target is at work or home when attacked; the target is in a
motorcade; and when higher numbers of victims are struck (i.e., injuries and fatalities).
Successful assassinations are more likely when: firearms are used; terrorists attack from a
motorcycle; higher numbers of collateral deaths occur (i.e., deaths other than the target or
terrorists); and when terrorists are in close proximity to their target. The regional models also
contain some distinct findings compared to the full model. The Middle East and North Africa
model finds that successful attacks are less likely when family of the target and bystanders are
present during an attack. Successful assassinations are also more likely in the Middle East when
suicide bombs are used. For the South Asia model, successful assassinations are more likely
when multiple weapon types are used, as well as when weapon types other than firearms and
explosives are used. In Southeast Asia, successful assassinations are less likely when security is
present but does not respond to the terrorists. For the Sub Saharan Africa model, successful
assassinations are more likely when security is present but does not respond to the terrorists.
Several recommended measures directed towards disrupting and preventing successful
assassinations are provided based off of SCP and environmental criminology. These measures
include the following: having armed security personnel trained to effectively respond to
terrorists; having proactive security and police personnel detect and defuse weapons, as well as
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detect suspicious behavior before a terrorist can approach the target; implement strategically
placed security checkpoints; install metal detectors at key entry and exit points; install electronic
surveillance at locations where the target resides or works; use bullet-proof vehicles; have the
target wear a bulletproof vest; implement firearms tracking and registration requirements; arm
targets that have substantiated threats against them; vulnerable targets limit their time spent
outside and among crowds without protection; limit the proximity of bystanders to the target;
install barriers and fences in front of buildings where targets are located; have alert drivers who
can employ evasive driving maneuvers if attacked; seat the target strategically in the vehicle (i.e.,
in the middle of the vehicle); implement traffic restrictions, road barriers and street closures to
control access routes; limit the types of items and bags individuals can bring into venues
susceptible to attacks; conduct periodic background checks on security personnel; have targets
alter their daily travel routines; quickly clean up the scene of an assassination; and law
enforcement and civilians should be aware of terrorists consistently changing their tactics.
Overall, these recommendations highlight the need for target-hardening measures and other
strategies to increase the effort and risks involved for terrorists, as well as decrease their rewards.
When target, weapons, and tools opportunities for terrorists are reduced, the likelihood of an
assassination being successful decreases. As noted in the 9/11 Commission Report (2004),
terrorists will continue to analyze defenses and adapt their tactics when necessary. Protection
measures make it more difficult for terrorists to be successful when they attack. As a result, these
measures help to deter various types of terrorist attacks, including assassinations (9/11
Commission, 2004).
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Appendix
Codebook
Capital

Attack occurred in capital city
0 = Not in capital
1 = In Capital
-99 = Missing

CollateralD

Total collateral deaths from attack (deaths other than
target/terrorists)

DayofWeek

Day of week attack occurred
1 = Monday
2 = Tuesday
3 = Wednesday
4 = Thursday
5 = Friday
6 = Saturday
7 = Sunday
-99 = Missing

MultipleTer

Was there more than one terrorist at the scene of the attack?
0 = No, only one terrorist involved; no terrorist present (i.e., if
only bomb, would be coded as 0 because no terrorists at scene of
attack just bomb).
1 = Yes, more than one terrorist involved
-99 = Missing

OthersAround

Were others around during the attack
0 = No one other than target/ terrorists/ security present
1 = Only family of target present
2 = Only bystanders present
3 = Family and bystanders present
-99 = Missing
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Season

Season attack occurred (Fall = reference)
0 = Fall (September – November)
1 = Winter (December – February)
2 = Spring (March – May)
3 = Summer (June – August)
-99 = Missing

SecPres

Security presence
0 = No security guards present
1 = Security guards present but no response
2 = Security guards present and respond
-99 = Missing

TargetProx

Terrorists attacked in close proximity to target (point-blank
range; bomb hits target’s car; terrorists enter home and injure/kill
target)
0 = Not in close proximity to target
1 = In close proximity to target
-99 = Missing

TerroristLoc

Location of terrorists OR weapon used by terrorists during attack
(i.e., sticky bomb would be coded as inside car; an IED placed
inside a home would be coded as inside home, etc.)
0 = Terrorists attacked while outside a physical building or
structure (not in any motor vehicle)
1 = Terrorists attacked from a motor vehicle
2 = Terrorists attacked from a motorcycle
3 = Terrorists attacked while inside a building/structure
4 = Terrorists attacked from elsewhere
-99 = Missing

TargetLoc

Location of target during the attack
0 = Target outside
1 = Target in motor vehicle
2 = Target on motorcycle
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3 = Target inside building or structure (that is not work or home)
4 = Target at work
5 = Target at home
6 = Target at other location
-99 = Missing
Target attacked while in motorcade or convoy
TargetMotorcade
0 = Not in motorcade
1 = In motorcade
-99 = Missing

TargetType

Was the target an official (government) or unofficial (private
citizen) target?
0 = Government (diplomatic and general)
1 = Journalists
2 = Military
3 = Police
4 = Private citizens
5 = Religious figures
6 = Terrorists / Non-state militia
7 = Violent political party
8 = Other (airports, business, education, NGO, transportation)
-99 = Missing

OfficialTarget

Was the target an official (government) or unofficial (private
citizen) target?
0 = Unofficial target
1 = Official target
-99 = Missing

TimeDay

Time of day that attack occurred
1 = 12:00 am – 05:59 am
2 = 06:00 am – 11:59 am
3 = 12:00 pm – 05:59 pm
4 = 06:00 pm – 11:59 pm
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-99 = Missing
VictimsStruck

Total number of victims struck (fatalities and injuries)
Weapon type used during attack

WeaponType
0 = Explosives (not sticky bomb or suicide)
1 = Firearms
2 = Sticky bombs
3 = Suicide bombs
4 = More than one weapon type used
5 = Other weapon type used
-99 = Missing
Year

Year attack occurred
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